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After a five-year housing boom achieved record market highs in 2005
and 2006,' the United States housing market collapsed. By the end of 2008,
prices had fallen at a record pace of eighteen percent within the last twelve
months. 2 Experts and analysts fear that this face-first, downhill skid is only
the beginning of an onslaught of accelerating price drops.3 As a result,
foreclosures will continue, and almost every other aspect of the United
States economy will continue to be pulled further into recession.
1. Brian Louis, U.S. Housing Market May Bottom in 2009, Zandi Says, BLOOMBERG.COM, Feb.
9, 2009, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=
aJTtcFir47.E&refer-home ("Demand for new and existing homes began to fall in 2005, marking the
end of a five-year U.S. housing boom fueled in part by easy credit for subprime borrowers. Existing
home prices tumbled from an average high of $230,200 in July 2006 to $175,400 in December,
according to data from the Chicago-based National Association of Realtors.").
2. Ruth Mantell, Home Prices Off Record 18% in Past Year, Case-Shiller Says,
MARKETWATCH, Dec. 30, 2008, http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/home-prices-off-record-
18/story.aspx?guid=%7BBF591131-9F33-46B5-AA21-E9769244FE5A%7D. In December 2008,
Case-Shiller home price index published that prices in all of its market cities fell substantially
compared to 2007, 14 of the 20 metro areas researched showed record rates of annual declines, and
for the "original 10-city index, prices fell a record 19.1% in the previous 12 months." Id. Measuring
the average change in home prices in several major metropolitan areas, the S&P/Case-Shiller Metro
Area Home Price Indices are market records and analyses that are measurements of benchmark
housing prices in the United States. Standard & Poor's, S&P/Case-Shiller Metro Area Home Price
Indices, May 2006, http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdflindex/SPCSMetroArea_
HomePrices Methodology.pdf. The indices "measure changes in housing market prices given a
constant level of quality." Id.
3. See Standard & Poor's, supra note 2.
4. Id; see also Jonathan Burton, Ten Investment Ideas for 2009, MARKETWATCH, Dec. 29,
2008, http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/Ten-investment-ideas-make-you/story.aspx?guid=
%7BD3DEIB99-663C-43E2-9F97-lB6BD4A232FC%7D ("Now we face the worst economic times
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Predictably, as the economy on the whole slides, jobs are lost, cash-flow
slows, financial burdens cannot be absolved, mortgages cannot be paid, and
houses cannot be sold or purchased. The housing predicament is further
exacerbated not only by the high percentage of household income absorbed
by mortgage costs,' but also by the need for affordable housing, which has
far outstripped the supply.6  The exorbitant demand, which fueled the
dramatic increase in price during the first five years of the twenty-first
century, has boomeranged back to a negative demand due to high
unemployment and high housing costs, causing a sudden standstill in
demand and an overwhelming increase in supply.' In response to tumbling
housing sales, builders are forced to reduce new housing production, which
since the Great Depression. The coming year will bring more job losses, bankruptcies, foreclosures,
cutbacks. Consumers and companies will spend less, dig out of debt, save what they can. The
incoming administration of President-elect Barack Obama will try to do its part-keeping interest
rates low, funding job-creating projects and printing money to stimulate the contracting economy.");
John Bellamy Foster, The Financialization of Capital and the Crisis, MONTHLY REV., Apr. 2008, at
1, 2, available at http://www.monthlyreview.org/080401foster.php ("Since the collapse of the
subprime mortgage market in July 2007, financial distress and panic have spread uncontrollably not
only across countries but also across financial markets themselves, infecting one sector after another:
adjustable rate mortgages, commercial paper (unsecured short-term corporate debt), bond insurers,
commercial mortgage lending, corporate bonds, auto loans, credit cards, and student loans.").
5. Michelle DaRosa, Comment, When Are Affordable Housing Exactions an Unconstitutional
Taking?, 43 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 453, 453 (2007) ("[O]ne out of every seven households in the
United States pays more than half of its gross income for housing, while the Department of Housing
and Urban Development suggests that a family should spend no more than 30% of their gross
monthly income on housing.").
6. Douglas R. Porter, The Promise and Practice of Inclusionary Zoning, in GROWTH
MANAGEMENT AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING: DO THEY CONFLICT? 212, 213 (Anthony Downs ed.,
2004). Data collected from 1981 to 2000 shows that in twenty-eight metropolitan regions, there is a
dramatic discrepancy between job growth (with about twelve million over that time period) and
housing growth (with only seven million units being completed over the same time period). Id The
same study analyzed this shortcoming and determined that production of housing units is off-pace on
an average of 88,000 units per year. Id. "[C]onstruction of new housing has not kept pace with job
growth and household formation, and the pace of multifamily construction suitable for lower-income
households is far below that of single-family homes." Id. at 213-14. This crisis has bled into the
rental housing market as well. Since 1997, "rental costs have risen faster than the consumer price
index," devaluing the income of renters, who are more than likely to be on the bottom of the
financial totem pole. Id. at 213. Furthermore, the "Department of Housing and Urban Development
estimates that housing affordable by very low income renters dropped by 7 percent-about 1.14
million units-in just two years (1997-1999)." Id.
7. In 2008, Southern California home sales dropped dramatically in the wake of the housing
bubble burst. See Peter Hong, Southern Calfornia Home Sales Drop to 20-Year Low, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 14, 2008, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/feb/l4/business/fi-homesl 4 . Double digit slides of
upwards of fifty-three percent illustrate the tightening of the housing market that has aggravated the
nation's financial woes. Id.; see also Nina Wu, Housing Market Dives, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN,
Jan. 6, 2009, at 8, available at http://www.starbulletin.com/news/20090106_December
home sales drop_19.html.
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negatively affects the availability of affordable housing.! With surges in
housing prices between 1999 and 2005,9 the sudden collapse of the housing
market, the recent credit crunch, and the chronic inability of housing
production to meet affordable housing needs,'o this recent housing
predicament truly is a crisis that has affected the overall economy and will
continue to negatively affect the financial dispositions of the lower- and
middle-income brackets."
In response, several competing ideas and plans have been proposed to
correct the financial crisis and help homeowners pay their mortgages. Free
market advocates and politicians promote an approach that will ultimately
put the responsibility on the homebuyers themselves.12 Others recognize the
8. See Luke Mullins, The Top 5 Housing-Market Hopes for 2009, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, Dec. 18, 2008, http://www.usnews.com/articles/business/real-estate/2008/12/18/the-top-5-
housing-market-hopes-for-2009.html. Because of a sharp decline in the demand for new homes,
"home builders have been forced to sharply pull back on new construction." Id. Government
surveys and reports discovered that at the end of 2008, "housing starts dropped to their lowest level
since 1959, when officials started keeping the statistics. [T]hat's bad news for the economy-
because it means fewer jobs for builders and others . . . ." Id. As explained below, affordable
housing grows congruously with market-rate housing, and a halt in creating market-rate homes is a
halt on creating affordable homes. See also Jeremy Kutner, Affordable Housing Hits Wall in Time of
Rising Need, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Feb. 6, 2009, at 4, available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0206/pO4sO1-usec.html ("With the whole housing market in a deep
freeze, it's perhaps not surprising that fewer low-income units-which require huge subsidies to get
built even in flush times-are being constructed.").
9. MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER & G. THOMAS KINGSLEY, FEDERAL PROGRAMS FOR
ADDRESSING LOW-INCOME HOUSING NEEDS 2 (2008), available at http://www.urban.org/
UploadedPDF/411798_low-income housing.pdf. "From 1999 through 2005, U.S. housing markets
experienced an unprecedented boom. Changes in policies and market mechanisms, including a vast
increase in subprime lending, substantially expanded the number of homeowners, while the number
of renters remained flat." Id.
10. BENJAMIN POWELL & EDWARD STRINGHAM, HOUSING SUPPLY AND AFFORDABILITY: Do
AFFORDABLE HOUSING MANDATES WORK? 1 (2004), available at http://reason.org/files/
020624933d4cO4a615569374fdbeef41.pdf.
11. Stephanie Armour, Existing Home Sales Skid in June: Housing Market Distress Also Lowers
Median Price, USA TODAY, July 25, 2008, at IB, available at http://www.usatoday.com/
printedition/money/20080725/lbhomesales25.art.htm (noting that "deepening worries about the
economy-amid rising mortgage rates, layoffs and inflation-are plaguing real estate and
forestalling any recovery."); see also Stephanie Armour, Home Sales, Prices Drop as Traditionally
Strong Spring Season Starts, USA TODAY, Apr. 23, 2008, at 9A (noting that unemployment, sales
closing at bottom, and a tightening of home loans is drastically hurting the housing market and many
families.). Large corporations are not immune to the housing and economic crisis as illustrated by
General Motor's loss of billions as net-income indicators show drops of up to ninety percent. John
O'Dell, GM Hurt by Weak Housing Market, L.A. TIMES, May 4, 2007, at Cl. Inexperienced
workers and young job-seekers are also feeling the impact. Erik Eckholm, Working Poor and Young
Hit Hard in Downturn, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/
11/09/us/09young.html ("A kind of domino effect is beginning to squeeze out the least skilled or
experienced workers-those already on the bottom of the ladder-who are settling for part-time
employment and fewer hours if they can find work at all. Hardest hit of all are younger job-seekers,
especially black males in their late teens or early 20s without more than a high school education.").
12. Some free-marketers believe a "do nothing" strategy is the key to long term success. See
Luke Mullins, Peter Schif Let the Housing Market Crash, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 23,
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to the housing problem. 13
2009, http://www.usnews.com/blogs/the-home-front/2009/l/23/peter-schiff-let-the-housing-market-
crash.html. Peter Schiff finds that government intervention cannot be the solution: "[T]he
government's response to the housing crisis has only made matters worse and ... the best way to
help the market would be to let home prices fall further." Id. In April 2008, Congressman John
Shadegg proposed the Homeowner Empowerment Act of 2008 as a solution:
[The act] would temporarily allow Americans to tap into retirement plans, without paying
penalties or taxes, to make their mortgage payments or the personal mortgage payments
of any other individual . . . [thus] [e]nabling borrowers, family or friends with retirement
accounts to make mortgage payments would stave off additional defaults.
John Shadegg, A Free Market Approach To Housing Crisis, RELISTR, Apr. 29, 2008,
http://relistr.com/real-estate/a-free-market-approach-to-housing-crisis.html.
13. Academics, bloggers, and pundits who highly prize the protective oversight of government
intervention claim that the housing crisis was caused by a failure of the free market. See, e.g., Jeff
Rosenberg, Correcting for Market Failures, MNPUBLIUS.COM, June 29, 2009,
http://mnpublius.com/2009/06/. Many politicians believe that government action is the way out of
the housing problems facing struggling homeowners, homebuyers, and renters:
Senator Obama said he would take the following steps to solve the current foreclosure
and credit liquidity problems.
1. Create a new Federal Housing Administration Housing Security Program. The
Senator supports the efforts of Senate Banking Committee Chairman Chris Dodd (D-CT)
to create a new program that will incentivize lenders to buy or refinance existing
mortgages and convert them into stable 30-year fixed mortgages with a federal guarantee
provided for the resulting loans. Senator Obama called this a "backstop" not a "bailout."
2. Ask lenders to write down loan amounts for more conventional borrowers. Lenders
should take action to restructure loans as early as possible when borrowers are at risk of
financial trouble or when housing prices plummet. To alleviate lender concerns over tax
and legal issues, the Senator's plan also calls for legislation that will clarify the ability of
servicers to act on behalf of the loans investors/owners.
3. Closing the bankruptcy loophole for mortgage companies. Under current Chapter 13
rules, judges cannot modify the terms of home mortgages, even if the loan was unfair or
predatory. Making this change could prevent as many as 600,000 foreclosures.
4. Create a new mortgage interest tax credit which will assist homeowners who do not
itemize their taxes. This would involve a 10 percent universal mortgage credit which
will, effectively, cut 10 percent off of the interest rate paid by 10 million, mostly low
income, home owners.
5. Provide an additional $10 billion of Mortgage Revenue Bond (MRB) authority. These
are used to refinance subprime loans and provide mortgages for first-time homebuyers
but are currently over-subscribed in most states.
6. Combat mortgage fraud and predatory subprime lending by defining mortgage fraud
on the federal level, increasing funding for federal and state law enforcement programs
and creating new criminal penalties for fraud.
7. Require more accurate and understandable loan disclosure documents.
Glenn Setzer, Senator Obama Lays out Housing Policy-Third in a Series, MORTGAGE NEWS
DAILY, Apr. 4, 2008, http://www.mortgagenewsdaily.com/442008_Obama HousingPlan.asp
(summarizing the President's plan found at BarackObama.com, Barack Obama's Plan to Restore
Confidence in the Markets, Tackle the Housing Crisis and Help Protect Families from the Economic
Slowdown, http://obama.3cdn.net/f9836ef496f75a9be0 39gimvt5b.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2009)).
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Looking to the government for housing assistance is not something new.
Since the early 1940s, there has been a constant push for government
intervention in housing prices and zoning regulations to aid medium- to
lower-income families and other citizens in owning a home.14  Programs
enacted for this purpose are under the umbrella policy of "affordable
housing." 5  Basically, affordable housing denotes "housing [that] is
available at a reduced cost for households with incomes at or below specific
levels."' 6  On the federal level, the government has assisted lower-income
home buyers by enacting the HOME Program, 7 SHOP,18 and HOZ.19
On a state and local level, municipalities, with the encouragement of
affordable housing proponents, have been advocating inclusionary zoning.
Inclusionary zoning practices require that a pre-determined percentage of the
housing units in new real estate developments be reserved and sold at a price
that is affordable to low- and moderate-income households.20 The number
14. A major push for government intervention was the homecoming of millions of American
men after World War II and the prospects of having the streets laden with homeless veterans. See
Gerald W. Sazama, Lessons from the History of Affordable Housing Cooperatives in the United
States: A Case Study in American Affordable Housing Policy, 59 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 573, 580
(2000). Thus, by war's end "a disposition policy was developed amending the 1940 Housing Act,
ensuring that those public housing projects not converted to low-income housing, would first be sold
to veterans, then to residents, and, lastly, to private realtors." Id. This was achieved despite
squabbling on Capitol Hill and taught housing advocates that federal aid can be tough to come by,
regardless of ample support from the voting public. Id.
15. See City of Santa Clarita, Affordable Housing & Services, http://www.santa-
clarita.com/cityhall/cd/housing/index.asp (last visited Nov. 14, 2009).
16. Id
17. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Affordable Housing Programs, http://www.hud.gov/
offices/cpd/affordablehousing/programs/index.cfm (last visited Nov. 14, 2009) ("The HOME
program helps to expand the supply of decent, affordable housing for low and very low- income
families by providing grants to States and local governments called participating jurisdictions or
'PJs'. PJs use their HOME grants to fund housing programs which meet local needs and priorities.
PJs have a great deal of flexibility in designing their local HOME programs within the guidelines
established by the HOME program statute and Final Rule. PJs may use HOME funds to help
renters, new homebuyers or existing homeowners.").
18. Id. ("SHOP provides funds for non-profit organizations to purchase home sites and develop
or improve the infrastructure needed to set the stage for sweat equity and volunteer-based
homeownership programs for low-income families. SHOP is authorized by the Housing
Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996 as ammended [sic], Section 11, and is subject to other
Federal crosscutting requirements. National and regional nonprofit organizations or consortia with
experience in using volunteer labor to build housing may apply. This is a competitively based
program funded through the NOFA.").
19. Id. ("The Homeownership Zone program allows communities to reclaim vacant and blighted
properties, increase homeownership, and promote economic revitalization by creating entire
neighborhoods of new, single-family homes, called Homeownership Zones. Communities that apply
for HOZ funds are encouraged to use New Urbanist design principles by providing for a pedestrian-
friendly environment, a mix of incomes and compatible uses, defined neighborhood boundaries and
access to jobs and mass transit.").
20. Smart Growth/Smart Energy Toolkit, Inclusionary Zoning, http://www.mass.gov/envir/
smartgrowth toolkit/pages/mod-iz.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2009).
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of cities with inclusionary zoning mandates has grown rapidly, and between
1999 and 2003, "the number of California communities with inclusionary
zoning more than tripled, from 29 to 107 communities."21
There are currently two types of inclusionary zoning: voluntary and
mandatory. Voluntary inclusionary zoning allows a prospective developer
to choose whether to participate in a program that can potentially increase
the inventory of affordable housing in a community.22 There has been heavy
criticism of voluntary programs because, by being voluntary in nature, they
do not produce the kinds of results that housing advocates demand. 23 Thus,
there has been a fervent push for mandatory inclusionary zoning. Such
21. See POWELL & STRINGHAM, supra note 10, at 1. "California was an early leader in the
adoption of inclusionary zoning, and its use there has grown rapidly in the state . ... [Today], 20
percent of California communities . . . have inclusionary zoning." Id. The primary reason for the
panicked adoption of these programs is that since the early 1980s, there has been a rapid increase
California housing prices. See Nico Calavita, Origins and Evolution of lnclusionary Housing in
California, in INCLUSIONARY ZONING: THE CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCE 3 (2004), available at
http://www.oaklandnet.com/BlueRibbonCommission/PDFs/BlueRibbon25-NHC IZRpt.pdf. Some
of the factors that contributed to the sharp increases are:
[1.] Heavy in-migration during the 1970s and 1980s, and the inability of the housing
industry to keep up with demand....
[2.] NIMBYism. Successful opposition on the part of residents to new residential
development-especially higher density-both at the periphery and in urbanized
communities, limits housing construction.
[3.] Declines in investment in public infrastructure at the state and local levels reduces
the availability of developable land. One result is unusually high development impact
fees. While the full amount is not necessarily passed on to consumers-fees tend to
reduce land prices-high fees usually result in higher housing costs. The main cause of
the infrastructure deficit at the local level is Proposition 13, passed in 1978, that limited
property tax revenues.
[4.] Proposition 13 has another significant deleterious effect on the housing market.
Fiscally impoverished cities engage in "fiscal zoning" that encourages commercial land
uses that generate sales taxes while discouraging housing perceived as a fiscal drain
because of the need for services that it generates.
[5.] Many existing metropolitan regions such as Los Angeles and San Diego were
developed on coastal plains and mesas. The remaining land is highly constrained from an
environmental standpoint, especially in terms of slopes and biology.
Id. at 3-4 (citations omitted).
22. See Andrew G. Dietderich, An Egalitarian's Market: The Economics of Inclusionary Zoning
Reclaimed, 24 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 23, 45 (1996); see also TOM MEANS ET AL., BELOW-MARKET
HOUSING MANDATES As TAKINGS: MEASURING THEIR IMPACT 7 (2007), available at
http://www.independent.org/pdf/policyreports/2007-11-09-housing.pdf. "Developers could then
weigh the benefits and costs of participating, and if the benefits exceeded the costs, the developers
could voluntarily comply." Id.
23. See infra note 393. Affordable housing advocates deride voluntary inclusionary zoning
programs for not being able to produce "housing affordable for low- and very-low-income
households" and "must rely heavily on federal, state, and local subsidies in most cases." NICHOLAS
BRUNICK ET AL., VOLUNTARY OR MANDATORY INCLUSIONARY HOUSING? PRODUCTION,
PREDICTABILITY, AND ENFORCEMENT 3-4 (2004).
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mandatory programs do not give the prospective developer the choice of
participation, but, rather, require that builders either include affordable
housing units in their development or comply with one of the alternative
requirements.24
Unsurprisingly, when a program requires a private party to comply with
the regulations and demands of a public entity, debate erupts. Although
criticized early in their development,25 inclusionary zoning programs have
been upheld by courts as a valid technique to further advance the legitimate
state interest of affordable housing.26 The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to
rule on mandatory inclusionary zoning ordinances. However, in the last
major case concerning inclusionary zoning, Home Builders Association v.
City of Napa, the California Supreme Court held that a very municipality-
friendly mandatory program was a valid affordable housing technique.27
Since Home Builders Association, substantial research and study has
raised questions about both the constitutionality and the effectiveness of
mandatory inclusionary zoning ordinances. 28  This Comment embraces the
new data and finds that, in direct opposition to the court's decision in Home
24. See Dietderich, supra note 22, at 45. Mandatory inclusionary zoning ordinances are much
more aggressive than voluntary programs because they take "away a developer's choice ... [and]
require[] the developer to dedicate to low-income use part of any new development above a certain
size, but [may] offer[] a density bonus to compensate the developer for possible losses." Id
25. See generally Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of "Inclusionary" Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REv.
1167 (1981). Ellickson, the Walter E. Meyer Professor of Property and Urban Law at Yale Law
School, concludes that inclusionary zoning programs endorsed by local and state governments will
actually aggravate the affordable housing crisis it has been designed to resolve. Id. at 1215. He
reasons his argument on the deduction that:
Inclusionary zoning involves in-kind housing subsidies, a method increasingly viewed as
one of the most inefficient forms of income redistribution. Inclusionary zoning can also
constitute a double tax on new housing construction-first, through the burden of its
exactions; and second, through the "undesirable" social environment it may force on new
housing projects. . . . [T]his double tax is likely to push up housing prices across the
board, often to the net injury of the moderate-income households inclusionary zoning was
supposed to help.
Id. at 1215-16.
26. Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60 (Ct. App. 2001); Holmdel
Builders Ass'n v. Twp. of Holmdel, 583 A.2d 277 (N.J. 1990); S. Burlington County NAACP v.
Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II), 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983).
27. See Home Builders Ass'n, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60 (holding that the ordinance in question is not
a violation of the takings clauses, did not evoke a Nollan/Dolan heightened scrutiny, and met the
requirement of advancing a legitimate state interest); see also DaRosa, supra note 5, at 473-74.
"The Supreme Court has not ruled on an affordable housing ordinance takings challenge, either in a
facial challenge or as applied .... " Id. at 473.
28. Because the Home Builders Ass'n decision was not entirely comprehensive and failed to
included certain factors in its reasoning, many law review articles, legal journals, and policy reports
have criticized the decision and concluded in strict opposition to the California Supreme Court. See
generally DaRosa, supra note 5; see also MEANS ET AL., supra note 22. Furthermore, experts in
economics and public policy have compiled the latest data and have criticized inclusionary zoning
programs for their negative affects both on housing inventory and housing costs. See POWELL &
STRINGHAM, supra note 10; see also MEANS ET AL., supra note 22.
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Builders Association,29 mandatory inclusionary ordinances are exactions30
that require heightened scrutiny, and many, if not all, programs fail under
this standard.3' Even if courts do not apply an exaction analysis, mandatory
inclusionary zoning programs fail under both the Lucas and the Penn
Central takings standard.32 As a result, the programs that are utilized today
amount to unconstitutional takings and are contradictory to the purpose of
inclusionary zoning. 3 In response, this Comment offers a possible solution
to the shortcomings of the mandatory inclusionary zoning programs
currently in force.34  Although not as aggressive as current mandatory
programs in creating housing that is affordable for the lowest income
bracket, the proposed solution side-steps constitutionality complaints,
entices developers, and achieves the ultimate goals of inclusionary zoning.
This Comment will discuss affordable housing basics, inclusionary
zoning fundamentals, mandatory program deficiencies, and a proposed
solution. Part II lays down the historical foundation of affordable housing,
as well as the emergence of inclusionary zoning. Part III explains
inclusionary zoning basics and analyzes the legal challenges against this
type of affordable housing technique. Part IV analyzes mandatory
inclusionary zoning ordinances and concludes that they are in fact exactions
that require a heightened scrutiny, and the programs in operation today fall
short both constitutionally and of their intended purpose. Part V presents a
possible program that avoids all the pitfalls associated with the current
mandatory inclusionary programs. Part VI concludes the Comment.
II. HISTORY OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING ACTION IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The Federal Government Gets Involved
The economic and social changes during the Industrial Revolution
brought about policies to institute affordable housing programs as a means
29. See Home Builders Ass n, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60.
30. See infra notes 151-216 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 218-35 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 236-345 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 346-81 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 382-422 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 39-67 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 68-109 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 110-422 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 382-422 and accompanying text.
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to house those at the lowest rung of the economic ladder. Just after World
War I, localized private sectors in the United States, primarily in New
England, set up the first American affordable housing programs by
establishing co-ops. 4 0  Affordable housing programs remained private for
about the first ten years of their existence. 4' Then, in the early 1920s, the
Second Progressive Movement began to influence social policy,42 and there
was a surge of societal pressure for affordable housing for the working
poor.43 Public sentiment along with the influence of the union movement
convinced an already very sympathetic Governor Al Smith to advocate for
the New York State Limited Dividend Housing Companies Act of 1927,
which "supported the development of all types of affordable housing," and is
credited as the first relatively large-scale government program that instituted
an affordable housing plan for low-income families."
Throughout the 1930s and early 1940s, the Great Depression and World
War II stunted the growth of affordable housing and kept government
programs small and regional. 45 However, sparked by President Franklin D.
39. See Sazama, supra note 14, at 573. Starting in the mid-nineteenth century in Europe,
cooperatives were organized by groups of urban workers to help craftsmen and members of their
trade find housing. Id at 576. Such programs did not come across the Atlantic until 1918. Id at
577-78.
40. Id. at 577-78. In support of these affordable housing efforts, trade unions with strong
socialist influences stepped in and shouldered the plight of urban workers looking for housing. Id. at
578. Some of these early unions were involved in an early form of social security to assist their
members with retirement, thus providing testing grounds for the national program that was adopted
by the federal government a few decades later. Id. Many of these unions were well experienced in
self-help projects for working families, and the early forms of affordable housing were consistent
with the union's agenda. Id.
41. Id. at 578.
42. The Second Progressive Movement was sparked by a split in the Republican Party in the
1920s. Encyclopedia Britannica, Progressive Party, Encyclopedia Britannica Online,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/478379/Progressive-Party (last visited Nov. 14, 2009).
Certain members of the party were frustrated by the conservative vein that controlled both the
Republican and Democratic parties of the day. Id
43. See Sazama, supra note 14, at 578.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 579. The most the government did for affordable housing was establish "public
housing" under the Public Works Administration and the United States Housing Authority. See The
Eleanor Roosevelt Papers, Public Works Administration, in TEACHING ELEANOR ROOSEVELT (Allida
Black et al. eds., 2003), available at http://www.nps.gov/archive/elro/glossary/pwa.htm. In the first
year of his presidency, Franklin D. Roosevelt signed into law the National Industrial Recovery Act.
Id. Written into the act was the creation of an agency that would be responsible for spending "big
bucks on big projects" in order to stimulate the economy out of the Great Depression. Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). Beyond funding projects like Bonneville Power and Navigation Dam, the
Public Works Administration was budgeted to improve public welfare (i.e. housing). Id. The
program proved to be a flop despite spending over six billion dollars on industrial projects. Id.
Moreover, the highlighted big failure "was in quality, affordable housing, building only 25,000 units
in four and a half years." Id.; see also Charles J. Orlebeke, The Evolution ofLow-Income Housing
Policy, 1949 to 1999, 11 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 489, 492 (2000), available at
http://www.mi.vt.eduldata/files/hpd%2011(2)/hpd%2011(2)_orlebeke.pdf.
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Roosevelt's "Economic Bill of Rights" invocation at the 1944 State of the
Union Address, 46 the federal government got involved and passed the
Housing Act of 1949.47 For nearly two decades, the public housing venture
under the Act fell short of production targets, each subsequent housing
program introduced failed to gain momentum, and "executive responsibility
for housing was fragmented." 48 This trend of failure did an about-face with
the establishment of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) in 1965,49 and three years later, the notion of federal
leadership in housing triumphed with the passing of a second act, the
Housing Act of 1968.50
Despite all of the praise and self-congratulation in Washington, D.C.
upon the passage of the Housing Act of 1968, this measure sputtered from
the very beginning.5' During the early years of the Nixon administration,
"attacks on the production-dominated strategy were mounting from both
inside and outside the federal government" despite the federal government's
success in meeting its subsidized housing goals. 52  In response, President
Nixon "forced a reexamination of federally administered production
46. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, State of the Union Address, Jan. 11, 1944, reprinted in THE
PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 32 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1944).
Roosevelt spoke of a second Bill of Rights that enumerated new rights to all persons, among these
"[t]he right of every family to a decent home ..... Id. at 41.
47. See Orlebeke, supra note 45, at 490.
For low-income housing advocates, the Housing Act of 1949 promised that the federal
government, given the means and the authority, could solve the nation's housing
problems through the exercise of committed political leadership at the top and the
implementation muscle of a technically skilled, socially conscious bureaucracy working
its will with an eager housing industry and compliant local governments.
Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. As part of President Lyndon B. Johnson's Great Society policy, the Department of
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 created HUD. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev.,
HUD History, http://www.hud.gov/library/bookshelfl2/hudhistory.cfm (last visited Nov. 14, 2009).
Since its inception, HUD's mission has been to "increase homeownership, support community
development and increase access to affordable housing free from discrimination." U.S. Dep't of
Hous. & Urban Dev., Mission, http://www.hud.gov/library/bookshelfl2/hudmission.cfm (last visited
Nov. 14, 2009). In order to fulfill this mission, the department has tried to "embrace high standards
of ethics, management and accountability and forge new partnerships-particularly with faith-based
and community organizations-that leverage resources and improve HUD's ability to be effective on
the community level." Id
50. See Orlebeke, supra note 45, at 490. "Reaffirmation of the 1949 goal with quantified
production targets and timetable, new housing subsidy programs generously funded, planning
requirements aimed at dispersing low-income housing throughout metropolitan regions, and even a




programs and a search for better alternatives," and suddenly imposed a
moratorium on all new subsidy commitments.53
In the wake of the 1973 moratorium, three policy instruments arose.
The first is the use of voucher-type programs "as the preferred subsidy
vehicle instead of large-scale subsidized housing production programs."5 4
The second, and most significant to this Comment, is the "formal transfer of
most housing program control from the federal government to state and local
governments."s The third is "the use of the tax system to induce desired
housing outcomes" through programs such as the Low Income Housing Tax
Credit (LIHTC) program.5 6
Focusing on the second instrument, transfer of responsibility to the local
governments, in effect, gave the states and municipalities the freedom to
enact any policy or program they determined would: (1) be the most
effective in solving the issue of affordable housing and (2) be most
beneficial to the social agenda of the state and local government. One such
program was inclusionary zoning.
B. Inclusionary Zoning-A Localized Solution to a National Problem
On a local and state level, government has attempted to solve the issue
of affordable housing by instituting inclusionary zoning mandates on
53. Id It was during this moratorium that Section 8 housing was created, which was an adoption
of the Experimental Housing Allowance Program (EHAP) and basically an updated version of the
Section 23 housing program created in the early sixties. See R. ALLEN HAYS, THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT & URBAN HOUSING: IDEOLOGY AND CHANGE IN PUBLIC POLICY 144-46 (1985); see
also Louis Winnick, The Triumph of Housing Allowance Programs: How a Fundamental Policy
Conflict Was Resolved, 1 CITYSCAPE 95, 106-12 (1995), available at
http://www.huduser.org/Periodicals/CITYSCPE/VOLINUM3/winnick.pdf (highlighting the early
efforts and successes of the EHAP). This form of housing was founded on the "housing allowance"
concept of providing a voucher subsidy to "low-income families living in privately owned rental
housing that meets certain standards." Edgar 0. Olsen & William J. Reeder, Does HUD Pay Too
Much for Section 8 Existing Housing?, 57 LAND ECON. 243, 243 (1981).
54. See Orlebeke, supra note 45, at 491. Considered the "most useful, cost-effective form of
subsidy," voucher programs and demand-side subsidies were considered in the 1990s to make the
most sense by some housing experts. Id. However, many opponents of voucher housing insist that
Section 8 housing not only destroys existing neighborhoods and communities, but perpetuates the
hardships of poverty. See Howard Husock, Let's End Housing Vouchers, CITY JOURNAL, Autumn
2000, at 84-91, available at http://www.city-journal.org/html/10_4 lets end housing.html.
55. See Orlebeke, supra note 45, at 491. The passing of the Housing Act of 1990 created the
HOME program which distributed grants to states and cities for housing needs and purposes. Id.
Under the program, local governments would receive federal money to create affordable housing for
both low-income earners and renters, and the executive decisions on how and where the money
would be used was left to the local governments. Id.
56. Id at 491-92. Like HOME, tax programs like the LIHTC program, enacted in 1986, "move
toward greater program control by states and cities, which determine the allocation of the credits to
specific projects." Id. at 492. Furthermore, on a political level, "the LIHTC is also helped by being
a tax expenditure rather than a spending item; as such, its cost tends to be hidden below the horizon
of general public awareness." Id.
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developers. The first attempt to set up an inclusionary zoning program took
place in Fairfax, Virginia, in 1971 . However, the ordinance was struck
down because the Virginia Supreme Court held that the legislature that
passed it did not have the authority to do so.18 Shortly thereafter, in 1974,
Montgomery County, Maryland successfully put in place the first adopted
inclusionary zoning program.59 This ordinance required that "15 percent of
new developments with more than 50 housing units be sold at a price
affordable to low income households."o With this, inclusionary housing
was introduced to the United States.
Inclusionary zoning ordinances have been sought as the means to solve
the affordable housing problem in a number of states.6I For instance, New
Jersey used the judicial system in Southern Burlington County NAACP v.
Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel 1) to establish an inclusionary
zoning device in an effort to satisfy the need for low-income housing. 62 In
the 1980s, housing prices soared by double-digit increases across the
country, creating a severe housing affordability crisis.63 California was hit
hardest by the increase due to massive domestic migration and the inability
to meet housing demands,6" and by 1992, "the average price of a resale
home in the state was 190 percent of the national average." 5 As a result, the
California legislature mandated that each city and county government put in
place an affordable housing plan.66 California and New Jersey have the
most extensive programs. However, other states have also been pushing for
the use of the technique to solve affordable housing problems.
57. See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
58. EDWARD A. TOMBARI, THE BUILDER'S PERSPECTIVE ON INCLUSIONARY ZONING 3 (2005),
available at http://www.zoningmatters.org/files/pdfs/BuilderPerspectiveonlZ.pdf
59. GERRIT-JAN KNAAP ET AL., HOUSING MARKET IMPACTS OF INCLUSIONARY ZONING 3
(2008), available at http://www.smartgrowth.umd.edu/research/pdf/KnaapBentoLowe-
InclusionaryHousing.pdf.
60. Id. For their compliance, developers would be allowed a density bonus of twenty percent
higher than that which was allowed by the zoning bureau. Id.
61. Barbara Ehrlich Kautz, Comment, In Defense ofInclusionary Zoning: Successfidly Creating
Affordable Housing, 36 U.S.F. L. REv. 971, 972-73 (2002).
62. 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975) (mandating that municipalities use inclusionary zoning techniques
in new developments to satisfy that region's need for low-income housing).
63. See Kautz, supra note 61, at 978.
64. Id. During this time, municipalities in California instituted impact fees and growth controls,
effectively slowing down the new development of housing during the 1980s. Id.
65. Id. "[O]nly twelve percent of families in San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Orange Counties
could afford the average price home." Id.
66. See id.; CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 65580, 65583(c) (West Supp. 2009).
67. See Kautz, supra note 61, at 977. Montgomery, Maryland's "Moderately Priced Dwelling
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III. INCLUSIONARY ZONING BASICS
A. What Is Inclusionary Zoning?
Inclusionary zoning strives to create affordable housing units within
new real estate developments "by requiring residential developers to set
aside a specified percentage of housing units in a proposed development [to
be priced] affordable to low- and moderate-income households." Because
affordable units created under an inclusionary zoning plan are developed at
the same time as, and usually within, newly developed housing projects, the
housing market alone is the purveyor and engine that drives the creation of
the affordable units.69  These programs have not only been introduced to
fight against the statistics articulated in the introduction of this Comment,o
but rather they have been implemented to provide the community with
affordable units and limit the seclusion and consolidation of affordable
housing neighborhoods.7 1 Although such programs are widespread across
the country, each municipality's program is unique and tailored to the
municipality's interests.72 Each community regulates its inclusionary zoning
program based on determined variables such as:
Unit Program" applies to all proposed residential developments of 20 units or more, and requires the
set-aside of between 12.5% and 15% of the units as affordable, with up to a 22% density bonus.
Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, In Brief: The MPDU Process for Developers and Builders,
http://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/dhctmpl.asp?url=/content/dhca/housing/housingP/mpdu/M
PDU Process Developers.asp (last visited Nov. 14, 2009). Massachusetts's Comprehensive Permit
Law (40B), proposed to bridge the poor and the wealthy, is an inclusionary zoning plan that allows
the developer to propose an affordable housing plan to the local housing commission, and would be
considered a "voluntary inclusionary zoning" program. See Jonathan Witten, Adult Supervision
Required: The Commonwealth ofMassachusetts's Reckless Adventures with Affordable Housing and
the Anti-Snob Zoning Act, 35 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 217 (2008).
68. MARY ANDERSON, OPENING THE DOOR TO INCLUSIONARY HoUSING 3 (2003), available at
http://www.bpichicago.org/documents/OpeningtheDoor.pdf. To illustrate inclusionary zoning more
clearly, imagine functional developer Home Builders Company (HBC) has purchased fifty acres of
land in Town-A and wishes to build one hundred single family homes on this site. Town-A has an
inclusionary zoning program that requires every master-planned community that has more than one
hundred single family homes to dedicate fifteen percent of the units to affordable housing prices.
The program requires that the affordable units be sold at a price that can be purchased by families
that have a total income of $50,000 a year. Thus, HBC must sell fifteen units at a price that is
affordable to families with that established income. This illustration highlights which party holds
the responsibility under inclusionary zoning programs.
69. See ANDERSON, supra note 68, at 3.
70. See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
71. See ANDERSON, supra note 68, at 4. "Inclusionary Housing Programs enable low- and
moderate-income families to live in homes indistinguishable from-and adjacent to-market-rate
housing, and to live in communities with better access to employment and educational
opportunities." Id.
72. Id. at 5.
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[1.] Whether the program is voluntary or mandatory ... [;]
[2.] What income levels qualify as "affordable"[;]
[3.] What percentage of units are set aside as affordable[;]
[4.] Whether developers receive any additional subsidies[;]
[5.] How long the units remain affordable[;]
[6.] The size of the developments that qualify[; and]
[7.] Whether developers can comply with the program by building
units off site or by paying a fee.
Many municipalities have utilized inclusionary zoning as a tool for
smart growth. A major incentive for cities to enact such a program is to
distribute "affordable housing-and the people that go with it-throughout
the community." Furthermore, housing advocates praise inclusionary
zoning because "it provides affordable housing without requiring municipal
funding."76 As a result, the responsibility to provide affordable housing is
placed squarely on the developers and, in many cases, other purchasers. 7
B. The Legal Challenges to Inclusionary Zoning
Since they have been introduced in the 1970s, inclusionary zoning
ordinances have been subjected to constitutional challenges: Fairfax County
v. DeGroff Enterprises,78 Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township
of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel 11),79 Holmdel Builders Association v.
Township ofHolmdel,so and Home Builders Association.8 '
73. Habitat for Humanity-New York City, Information on Inclusionary Zoning,
http://www.habitatnyc.org/pdf/Toolkit/InclusionaryZoning.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2009).
74. See Porter, supra note 6, at 214. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts's smart growth
website states that inclusionary zoning is "a very effective tool for communities wishing to increase
the affordable housing supply" and dedicates an entire page to inclusionary zoning on its smart
growth website. Smart Growth/Smart Energy Toolkit, supra note 20.
75. See Porter, supra note 6, at 215.
76. See Smart Growth/Smart Energy Toolkit, supra note 20. The Commonwealth of
Massachusetts's smart growth website states that the fact that inclusionary zoning does not require
public funds is the primary attraction. Id.
77. See Porter, supra note 6, at 218-20. Porter recognizes developers' argument that they are
forced to take on the responsibility for inclusionary zoning programs. Id. at 219. Furthermore,
Porter points out the arguments made by the same developers that building fees and municipal
requirements hike up costs and inclusionary zoning tacks on more costs which artificially hike up the
cost of their product. Id.
78. 198 S.E.2d 600 (Va. 1973).
79. 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983).
80. 583 A.2d 277 (N.J. 1990).
81. 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60 (Ct. App. 2001).
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In the first attack on an inclusionary zoning ordinance, Fairfax County,
the program was held to be invalid.82 The importance of this decision goes
beyond its holding for two specific reasons. First, under this act, developers
were not given compensation in the form of density bonuses or any other
incentives. This established an incentive requirement in inclusionary
zoning.84 Second, the court focused its decision on the zoning authority
given to Fairfax County under state law.85 This is significant in that it based
its reasoning on Virginia law and not federal law, leaving the question of
constitutionality up to federal courts.
Mount Laurel comprises two cases, one in 1975 and the other in 1983.
In the first case,86 the New Jersey Supreme Court invalidated an
82. Fairfax County, 198 S.E.2d 600. In 1973, Fairfax County issued an amendment to its zoning
ordinance requiring developers "of fifty or more dwelling units ... to build at least 15% of these
dwelling units as low and moderate income housing within the definitions promulgated by the
Fairfax County Housing and Redevelopment Authority (FCHRA) and the United States Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)." Id. at 601. The court determined that providing
affordable housing is a legitimate state purpose; however, the court did not approve of the act citing
two reasons. Id. at 602. First:
[I]n establishing maximum rental and sale prices for 15% of the units in the development,
[the act] exceeds the authority granted by the enabling act to the local governing body,
[by the state], because it is socio-economic zoning and attempts to control the
compensation for the use of land and the improvements thereon.
Id. Second:
[T]he amendment requires the developer or owner to rent or sell 15% of the dwelling
units in the development to persons of low or moderate income at rental or sale prices not
fixed by a free market . . . [s]uch a scheme violates the guarantee set forth in Section II
of Article 1 of the Constitution of Virginia, 1971, that no property will be taken or
damaged for public purposes without just compensation.
Id.
83. Fairfax County, 198 S.E.2d at 602.
84. This decree was later voided under Home Builders Association. See 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 63-
64.
85. Fairfax County, 198 S.E.2d at 602.
86. S. Burlington County NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel 1), 336 A.2d 713
(N.J. 1975). The first Mount Laurel case arose when the Southern Burlington County NAACP
"attack[ed] the system of land use regulation by defendant Township of Mount Laurel on the ground
that low and moderate income families are thereby unlawfully excluded from the municipality." Id
at 716. The township enacted an ordinance that, along with other regulations, restricted "minimum
lot area, lot frontage and building size requirements" and limited building to only single family
homes, effectively eliminating affordable housing for low- to moderate-income families. Id. at 728-
29. The New Jersey Supreme Court ultimately held that exclusionary zoning ordinances are
unconstitutional if they make it physically and economically impossible to provide low- and
moderate-income housing in the community. Id. at 731-34. The majority held that:
[T]he police power is the power of the state to act for the general welfare of the people of
the state; the police power may be delegated to local governments, but only if
municipalities also stay within the general welfare requirement; a land use ordinance that
serves the parochial welfare of a single community to the detriment of the general
welfare is therefore unconstitutional as beyond the power of government.
John M Payne, Reconstructing the Constitutional Theory of Mount Laurel II, 3 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL'Y 555, 558 (2000).
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exclusionary zoning practice8 ' and mandated the use of an inclusionary
zoning ordinance.88 The second Mount Laurel decision was accompanied by
five other cases that were heard together because they raised many similar
issues, and all were decided in a single opinion known as the Mount Laurel
II decision.89 This set of cases came to the New Jersey Supreme Court
because the passive remedies of the Mount Laurel I decision were
ineffective and created more litigation than they solved.90 Thus, the court in
the second case sharpened the remedies expressed in Mount Laurel .91 To
combat the inability to get developers to create affordable housing and
ameliorate poverty, the court laid ground for municipalities to adopt
87. Exclusionary zoning is the implementation of zoning practices that segregate one sector of
society from the others. Zoning practices that result in this separation have been scorned and
ridiculed as both racist and prejudiced. See Edward H. Ziegler, Urban Sprawl, Growth Management
and Sustainable Development in the United States: Thoughts on the Sentimental Quest for a New
Middle Landscape, II VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 26, 53 n. 116 (2003) ("Snob zoning and exclusionary
development codes, designed to appease affluent and 'outdoorsy' individuals, are strongly associated
with high rates of home ownership, high home values, high income levels, and white population
size."). Quoted in Ziegler's article, Anthony Downs, a senior fellow in the Economics Studies
program at the Brookings Institution, highlights the sentiments associated with exclusionary
practices:
[N]onpoor people have what are to them cogent social, economic, and personal security
reasons to remain physically and socially separated from poorer people. These motives
are reinforced by the social and ethnic differentiation of suburbs from central cities, wide-
spread racial discrimination and intolerance, and constant media reporting of adverse
conditions in central cities. In contrast, many of the poor believe that they would benefit
from being more geographically integrated with better-off groups. That would give them
better access to jobs and schools and an escape from concentrated-poverty environments.
But the nonpoor control the institutional processes that determine how income groups are
geographically distributed.
Id. at 53-54 n. 116 (quoting ANTHONY DowNS, NEW VISIONS FOR METROPOLITAN AMERICA 204
(1994)).
88. Mount Laurell, 336 A.2d at 731-34.
89. S. Burlington County NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II), 456 A.2d 390
(N.J. 1983). The accompanying cases were Urban League of Essex County v. Mahwah, 504 A.2d 66
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984); Round Valley, Inc. v. Township of Clinton, 413 A.2d 356 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980); Glenview Development Co. v. Franklin Township, 397 A.2d 384 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978); Caputo v. Township of Chester, Docket No. L-42857-74 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. Oct 4, 1978) (unreported); and Urban League of Greater New Brunswick v. Borough of
Carteret, 359 A.2d 526 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976).
90. See Payne, supra note 86; see also Holmdel Builders Ass'n v. Twp. of Holmdel, 583 A.2d
277, 279 (N.J. 1990) ("In the years following [the decision], many municipalities failed to comply
with the clear mandate of Mt. Laurel I. The failure to provide the necessary opportunity for
affordable housing led to a new legal challenge. [The court] clarified and reaffirmed the
constitutional mandate set forth in Mt. Laurel I, imposing an affirmative obligation on every
municipality to provide its fair share of affordable housing.").
91. Mount Laurel !I, 456 A.2d 390.
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inclusionary zoning ordinances.92 Specifically, the court majority stated that
there are two basic types of affirmative measures "that a municipality can
use to make the opportunity for lower income housing realistic: (1)
encouraging or requiring the use of available state or federal housing
subsidies and (2) providing incentives for or requiring private developers to
set aside a portion of their developments for lower income housing." This
case paved the way for hundreds of municipalities to implement set-aside
programs to create affordable housing.
Picking up where the Mount Laurel cases left off, Holmdel Builders
Association v. Township of Holmdel ruled on the legal validity of
alternatives to set-asides, and considered whether such ordinances exceeded
a local government's police powers.94 Again, this case was comprised of a
series of cases involving several municipalities attempting to comply "with
their obligation to provide a realistic opportunity for the construction of
affordable housing under [the New Jersey Supreme Court's] ruling in Mt.
Laurel II and the provisions of the [Fair Housing Act]."95 The court held
that:
92. Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 443; see also Holmdel Builders Ass'n, 583 A.2d at 279-80
("We enumerated several possible approaches by which municipalities could comply with the
constitutional obligation, including lower-income density bonuses and mandatory set-asides. We
stressed that 'municipalities and trial courts are encouraged to create other devices and methods for
meeting fair share obligations."' (quoting Mount LaurelII, 456 A.2d at 443)).
93. Mount Laurel I, 456 A.2d at 443. In the opinion, the majority firmly restated the doctrine of
the Mount Laurel I decision:
The constitutional power to zone, delegated to the municipalities subject to legislation, is
but one portion of the police power and, as such, must be exercised for the general
welfare. When the exercise of that power by a municipality affects something as
fundamental as housing, the general welfare includes more than the welfare of that
municipality and its citizens: it also includes the general welfare-in this case the
housing needs-of those residing outside of the municipality but within the region that
contributes to the housing demand within the municipality. Municipal land use
regulations that conflict with the general welfare thus defined abuse the police power and
are unconstitutional. In particular, those regulations that do not provide the requisite
opportunity for a fair share of the region's need for low and moderate income housing
conflict with the general welfare and violate the state constitutional requirements of
substantive due process and equal protection.
Id. at 415 (citing Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 713).
94. See Holmdel Builders Ass'n, 583 A.2d 277.
95. Id at 280. "The Townships of Chester, South Brunswick, Holmdel, Middletown, and Cherry
Hill all adopted ordinances to provide for low- and moderate-income housing. The ordinances, in
varying forms, impose fees on developers as a condition for development approval." Id. The
townships enacted the following:
[T]he Townships of Chester and South Brunswick have enacted ordinances that impose a
mandatory development fee on all new non-inclusionary developments as a condition for
development approval. Their ordinances do not give developers a density bonus in
exchange for the development fee. Middletown Township's ordinance imposes a
mandatory development fee on all new commercial development as a condition for
development approval. Non-inclusionary residential developers may choose between
constructing the affordable housing or paying an in-lieu fee. Density bonuses do not
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[I]nclusionary zoning through the imposition of development
fees is permissible because such fees are conducive to the creation
of a realistic opportunity for the development of affordable housing;
development fees are the functional equivalent of mandatory set-
asides; and it is fair and reasonable to impose such fee requirements
on private developers when they possess, enjoy, and consume land,
which constitutes the primary resource for housing.
Thus, the ordinances and techniques implemented by these
municipalities were not an overreaching of the zoning laws or an abuse of
the municipalities' police powers. 97
Home Builders Association is the most significant case for the purposes
of this Comment in that it deals most directly with inclusionary zoning in the
context of an exaction." Furthermore, this is the most recent case dealing
with mandatory inclusionary zoning and involves techniques widely used
today. The ordinance in Home Builders Association required "that ten
percent of all newly constructed units must be 'affordable' as that term is
defined" and offered no incentives to the developer.99  However, the
program did allow for two alternatives: (1) an "alternative equivalent
proposal" from the developer and (2) "in-lieu fees." 00 Furthermore, the
municipality planning committee has the power to waive any and all
requirements at its discretion.'0 ' The court upheld the mandatory
accompany any of the options. Holmdel Township enacted an ordinance that gives
developers a density bonus if they contribute to an affordable-housing trust fund. Cherry
Hill Township's ordinance imposes a mandatory development fee on all new commercial
developments and non-inclusionary residential developments of a sufficient size.
Id. at 282-83. In response to the ordinances, several builders' associations challenged the
ordinances as:
exceeding the authority of the zoning and police powers and the Fair Housing Act; an
invalid tax in violation of the uniform property taxation requirement of the New Jersey
Constitution; a taking without just compensation in violation of both the United States
and New Jersey Constitutions; and a denial of due process and equal protection in
violation of both the United States and New Jersey Constitutions.
Id. at 280.
96. Id. at 288 (citing Mount Laurel I, 456 A.2d at 390).
97. Id. ("Such measures do not offend the zoning laws or the police powers.").
98. For the significance of the exaction see infra notes 189-216. An in-depth discussion and
analysis of Home Builders Association and its facts is found later in this note. See infra notes 218-
235.
99. Home Builders Ass 'n, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 62.
100. Id. at 62-63.
101. Id.
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inclusionary program enacted by the City of Napa as a constitutional land
use ordinance.10 2
These four cases have provided a basic rubric for a legal defense of
inclusionary zoning ordinances. First, an inclusionary zoning ordinance that
violates state compensatory laws and goes beyond the local municipality's
zoning authority cannot be enacted. 03 Second, affordable housing set-asides
and development fees are valid inclusionary zoning techniques.'04 Third,
mandatory inclusionary zoning programs are valid without developer
benefits, but alternatives to introducing affordable units in market-rate
development must be in place.'0o With these three keystones to a valid
inclusionary zoning program, several municipalities have adopted all types
of programs specifically tailored towards their needs, wants, and policy
agendas.
C. Types of Inclusionary Zoning Programs
Inclusionary zoning programs have four basic formats: (1) mandatory
without incentives; (2) mandatory with incentives; (3) voluntary under
prescribed conditions; or (4) voluntary through ad hoc negotiated
agreements.'06  The current trend is to enact mandatory programs that
demand residential developers with projects of certain sizes to "provide a
share of affordable units in return for density bonuses or other compensatory
incentives." 0 7  However, some municipalities have mandatory programs
with no compensatory incentives, and still others have voluntary programs
with generous incentives.0 s A sampling of counties, cities, and townships
with inclusionary zoning programs shows that although the voluntary
programs are very popular across the board, there has been a dramatic push
for mandatory programs.'09  As a result, this onrush of mandatory
inclusionary zoning problems has invited scrutinous analysis and many
challenges from critics.
102. Id. at 67.
103. See Fairfax County, 198 S.E.2d at 602; see also notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
104. See Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 390; see also Holmdel Builders Ass'n, 583 A.2d at 288.
105. See Home Builders Ass'n, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 60.
106. See Porter, supra note 6, at 221-25.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 221, 226. Boulder, Colorado and Carlsbad, California are two communities that
impose inclusionary programs with no incentives. Id. Irvine, California and Somerville,
Massachusetts are two communities that have the voluntary incentive programs. Id
109. See id. at 222-25.
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IV. CHALLENGES TO MANDATORY INCLUSIONARY ZONING ORDINANCES
Within the last few decades, housing advocates, housing experts, and
politicians have rigorously endorsed the implementation of mandatory
inclusionary zoning. For instance, to combat the housing problems of New
York City, the PRATT Center for Community Developmento laid out its
proposal in a 2004 report advocating, first and foremost, that the city should
"[a]pply mandatory inclusionary zoning to all future neighborhood-wide
zoning changes.""' In addition, the DC Campaign for Inclusionary Zoning,
a subsidiary of Campaign for Mandatory Inclusionary Zoning,1 12 submitted a
plan to the zoning commission of Washington, D.C. that required developers
"to build inclusionary units with the larger market-rate development.""
This mandatory inclusionary zoning proposal persuaded the zoning
commission to adopt the plan into its official zoning rules and
requirements.114
Proponents of mandatory inclusionary zoning hang their hats on
numerous desired benefits and have affixed mandatory programs as their
spearhead in the fight against apparent housing ills."s From a sociological
110. See Pratt Center for Community Development, http://www.prattcenter.net/about (last visited
Nov. 14, 2009). "The [Pratt] Center was founded at the birth of the community development
movement, as the first university-based advocacy planning and design center in the U.S." Id.
11l. POLICYLINK & PRATT INSTITUTE CENTER FOR COMMUNITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL
DEVELOPMENT, INCREASING HOUSING OPPORTUNITY IN NEW YORK CITY: THE CASE FOR
INCLUSIONARY 27 (2004), available at http://prattcenter.net/sites/default/files/publications/
Inclusionary%2OZoning%20Full%20Report.pdf.
112. The Campaign for Mandatory Inclusionary Zoning is a "broad coalition of traditional
affordable housing allies along with progressive labor, religious and community-based groups."
Cheryl Cort, Policy Director, Coalition for Smarter Growth, Washington D.C.'s Campaign for
Mandatory Inclusionary Zoning, Presentation at the 2007 National Inclusionary Housing Conference
(Oct. 30, 2007), available at http://www.smartergrowth.net/anx/index.cfm/3,179,576/2007-10-
30cc.pdf.
113. DC Campaign for Inclusionary Zoning, Our Proposal, http://www.policylink.org/DCIZ/
proposal.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2009).
114. See Zoning Comm'n for the District of Columbia, Notice of Final Rulemaking, Z.C. Order
No. 04-33, May 18, 2006, available at http://dcoz.dc.gov/altemate/trans/transview.asp?
view-%2Forders%2FO4%2D33%2Epdf.
115. Housing advocates have used mandatory programs as their spearhead in their fight against
apparent affordable housing ills. This is demonstrated by former New Mexican Governor David
Resnik's speech at the National Inclusionary Zoning Conference. His list of nine recommendations
started off with:
Lesson #1: Enact a mandatory, not voluntary, [inclusionary zoning] law. Voluntary
programs don't produce much inclusionary housing. They simply give spineless public
officials political cover that "they've done something" while it's "business as usual" for
builders-but for only another five or ten years.
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standpoint, mandatory inclusionary programs are engineered to incorporate
both lower- and upper-class members of society into a single area and
eliminate the class strata in local neighborhoods, thereby decentralizing
poverty.116 Furthermore, by decentralizing poverty and integrating
communities, mandatory inclusionary zoning can potentially "alleviate
social problems such as crime and unemployment."" 7  Proponents further
tout that mandatory inclusionary zoning programs place the financial burden
on the shoulders of private developers and require no large public financial
investment.'18 Last, and most important, mandatory programs have created
more low-income housing units than similar voluntary plans."'
Beyond heralding the desired benefits of mandatory inclusionary zoning
programs, scholars and housing advocates have focused on rapid-growth
communities as prime locations to wedge in mandatory programs.12 0  The
advantage of planting these policies in growing communities is that it
enables affordable housing plans to harness the momentum of growing
markets, thereby creating more affordable housing units.121 The basic
Lesson #3: However, advocate firmly (if more quietly) that [inclusionary zoning] must
serve the full range of workforce housing needs. [Inclusionary zoning] must not only
help young police officers, firefighters, and teachers (for whom it is easy to rally public
support) but your community's hospital orderlies and nursing home aides, convenience
store clerks, and school janitors.
David Resnik, Former Governor of New Mexico, Keynote Address at the National Inclusionary
Housing Conference (Oct. 5, 2005), available at http://www.gamaliel.org/DavidRusk/
keynote%2010-5-05.pdf.
116. Brian R. Lerman, Note, Mandatory Inclusionary Zoning-The Answer to the Affordable
Housing Problem, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 383, 390 (2006). David Resnik's speech highlights
progressive housing policy's underlying principles:
Jim Crow by income is steadily replacing Jim Crow by race. As racial segregation
slowly diminishes, economic segregation increases-with heavy racial and ethnic
implications. [Inclusionary zoning] is the most direct tool to attack economic
segregation. Mixed-income neighborhoods are the best housing policy. Mixed-income
neighborhoods are the best school policy. Mixed-income neighborhoods are the best
anti-crime policy. Mixed-income communities are the best anti-fiscal disparities policy.
Resnik, supra note 115.
117. Lerman, supra note 116, at 390. Politicians and advocates contend that "[i]nclusionary
housing promotes economic and racial integration which can lead to a host of positive social and
economic outcomes such as improved schools, decreased crime, and reduced poverty, all of which
have not only significant social benefits, but also significant fiscal benefits to city government."
NICHOLAS BRUNICK, THE IMPACT OF INCLUSIONARY ZONING ON DEVELOPMENT 3 (2004), available
at http://www.bpichicago.org/documents/impact-iz-development.pdf.
118. Lerman, supra note 116, at 392.
119. Id. at 390; see also Bernard Tetreault, Arguments Against Inclusionary Zoning You Can
Anticipate Hearing, NEW CENTURY HOUSING, Oct. 2000, at 19, available at
http://www.nhc.org/pdf/pub-ncl 100.pdf ("The problem is that most of them, because of their
voluntary nature, produce very few units.").
120. See generally Ngai Pindell, Developing Las Vegas: Creating Inclusionary Affordable
Housing Requirements in Development Agreements, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 419 (2007).
121. Housing experts assert that not only do inclusionary zoning programs benefit from strong
housing markets, they require a vigorous market to operate. Steven Wright, Pros vs. Cons: Smart
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structure of inclusionary zoning depends on growth to encourage the
construction of new units including affordable housing units.122 However, as
discussed later in this Comment, a slowdown in production due to a sluggish
economy and the implementation of mandatory inclusionary zoning
programs will compound any housing slump and effectively reduce
affordable and market-rate housing production.123
Regardless of the increasing support for mandatory inclusionary
ordinances to house those in the low- and middle-income brackets, this
technique and many of the programs founded on this technique are
inefficient and unconstitutional. A government regulation can be challenged
as an uncompensated taking of private property "by alleging a 'physical'
taking, a Lucas-type total regulatory taking, a Penn Central taking, or a
land-use exaction violating the standards set forth in Nollan and Dolan."l24
This Comment finds that the latter three standards are appropriate for
mandatory inclusionary zoning ordinances and that this affordable housing
technique appears to falter under all three. Although there is much debate
about such a classification, a mandatory inclusionary zoning ordinance is an
exaction and is subject to intermediate scrutiny under the Nollan and Dolan
standards.125  This classification is ignored by housing advocates and
politicians, and many enacted mandatory inclusionary programs are overly
broad and thus invalid.126 Furthermore, these programs do not sufficiently
compensate developers, thus resulting in an unconstitutional taking under
Lucas and Penn Central.127  Last, the allotted alternatives to actually
building affordable units are ineffective in creating the housing that is
promised and increase the price on all the housing in the community. 28 As
Growth Experts Debate Inclusionary Zoning Strategies in an Effort to Win Affordable diverse
Neighborhoods, ON COMMON GROUND, Winter 2007, at 33, available at
http://www.realtor.org/smartgrowth.nsf/docfiles/winter07proscons.pdfl$FILE/winter07proscons.pd
f. "Lewis cautioned that inclusionary zoning requires a strong housing market to make it work,
noting 'if the market isn't strong, developers will look at inclusionary as the thing that's killing the
project."' Id.
122. See DC OFFICE OF PLANNING, INCLUSIONARY ZONING: A PRIMER 10-11 (2002), available at
http://www.planning.dc.gov/planning/lib/planning/news-room/2002/october/zoningprimer.pdf.
"Both mandatory and voluntary Inclusionary Zoning requirements rely on strong housing markets to
deliver units." Id. at 10.
123. See Kutner, supra note 8.
124. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005).
125. See infra notes 151-216 and accompanying text.
126. See infra notes 200-13 and accompanying text.
127. See infra notes 239-345 and accompanying text.
128. See infra notes 346-76 and accompanying text.
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implemented today, mandatory inclusionary policy falls short of its many
promises.
A. First Challenge: Mandatory Inclusionary Zoning Ordinances Are
Exactions
It is imperative to properly classify mandatory inclusionary zoning
programs to determine which level of scrutiny should be applied when
analyzing their constitutionality. Classification may depend on how the
program is structured. For instance, if the program allows for in-lieu fees,
what the fees are allocated for can impact the classification of the program.
But, regardless of offsets and other claimed incentives, the basic structure of
a mandatory inclusionary zoning ordinance requires that a developer provide
for a certain percentage of affordable housing within a new development. 129
Under this definition, there are four classifications within which analysts and
scholars place mandatory inclusionary zoning ordinances: (1) an impact fee;
(2) a form of rent control; (3) a tax; and (4) an exaction.
Some proponents of inclusionary zoning contend that the technique
should be considered and analyzed as a municipal impact fee. The argument
is as follows: Inclusionary zoning ordinances and impact fees both attempt
to reimburse the city or community for the resources "used up" by the newly
constructed development.130 Furthermore, the ordinances, like impact fees,
are legislative and "based upon a plan created with regard to the impact of
development," thus, deserving broad deference.131 However, this
categorization is misplaced. Impact fees are charges "applied to offset the
additional public-service costs of new development."132 The funds raised by
129. See ANDERSON, supra note 68, at 4 ("Inclusionary Housing Programs promote the
production of affordable housing by requiring residential developers to set aside a certain percentage
of the housing units in a proposed development to be priced affordable to low- and moderate-income
households.").
130. Proponents of the "impact fee" classification argue the following:
[M]arket-rate development cuts into the amount of land available for potential future use
as the site for affordable housing. Inclusionary zoning thus represents a local government
mechanism comparable to development fees (e.g., school impact fee or water and sewer
fee), to mitigate the effects of a new development proportionate to its impact on the
public infrastructure.
J. HUNTER SCHOFIELD & ANITA R. BROWN-GRAHAM, LOCALLY INITIATED INCLUSIONARY ZONING
PROGRAMS: A GUIDE FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN NORTH CAROLINA AND BEYOND 4 (2004)
available at http://www.sog.unc.edulpubs/electronicversions/pdfslinczonchl.pdf, see also Lerman,
supra note 116, at 383, 414; DANIEL J. CURTIN, JR. & CECILY T. TALBERT, CURTIN'S CALIFORNIA
LAND USE AND PLANNING LAW 320 (24th ed. 2004).
131. See Lerman, supra note 116, at 414. Broad deference allows for a very low standard of
scrutiny, requiring only a demonstration that the ordinance was put in place to create needed
affordable housing. Id. The court need only to find that the enacting board/committee "acted within
the scope of its authority." Id.
132. LAWRENCE W. LIBBY & CARMEN CARRION, OHIO UNIVERSITY EXTENSION FACT SHEET:
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the fees are usually dedicated to the provision of additional services, such as
"water and sewer systems, roads, schools, libraries, and parks and recreation
facilities, made necessary by the presence of new residents in the area ...
[and] are essentially user fees levied in anticipation of use, expanding the
capacity of existing services to handle additional demand."l 33 This means
that impact fees are used to help compensate for the increased demand of
infrastructure services and public facilities that are already in existence.134
Market-rate development does not impact anything the city provides that
would require an "affordable housing impact fee" to mitigate. The only
resource new market-rate development deprives affordable housing of is
land, and land is not a service that can be mitigated by an impact fee.
Generally, these fees, once collected, are allocated to service the new
development.'31 Fees cannot generate "new land"; thus, although
inclusionary zoning ordinances may incorporate impact fees'36 and affect
land much like impact fees, they are not one and the same.13 1
DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES 1, available at http://ohioline.osu.edulcd-fact/pdf/1 558.pdf (last visited
Nov. 14, 2009).
133. Id.
134. The Wisconsin Realtor's Association defines impact fees:
"[I]mpact fees" are financial contributions (i.e., money, land, etc.) imposed by
communities on developers or builders to pay for capital improvements within the
community which are necessary to service/accommodate the new development.
Impact fees, however, must be reasonable. To ensure fairness, impact fees can only be
assessed (1) for capital improvements that are a direct consequence of the new
development and (2) in an amount not exceed[ing] the proportionate share required to
serve the new development. In other words, a developer cannot be required to pay a
disproportionate share of improvements that also benefit other persons (i.e., a bridge on
the other side of town).
Wisconsin Realtors Association, Impact Fees, http://www.wra.org/government/land-use/
impact fees/default.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2009). This fee is best understood with an example.
If a builder is adding one hundred more houses to a city, the city must build additional sewer
facilities and possibly widen intercepting piping to hold the waste product of one hundred more
houses. The city must respond to the additional impact on the infrastructure already in place, and
thus charges an impact fee.
135. Id.
136. See infra note 151.
137. Although it is evident that inclusionary zoning is not an impact fee, it does, however, have
the effect that an impact fee does by taxing the developers.
To the extent that subsidies do not cover the costs of below-market units, inclusionary
zoning, much like development impact fees, will act like a tax on market-rate
development. Although the builders may appear to bear the burden of paying for the
below-market units, they might end up passing part or all of this effective tax onto buyers
or sellers of undeveloped land. Who actually bears the burden of any tax is determined
by actual market conditions, specifically the relative elasticities of supply and demand.
Examining the economics of an inclusionary tax will help to determine how the burden is
likely to be split between the builders, market-rate home buyers, and owners of
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A more appropriate classification is that inclusionary zoning ordinances
are a form of price control on par with rent control.' In some jurisdictions,
inclusionary zoning ordinances place a price ceiling on the affordable units
in a new development tract.'39  It has been argued that inclusionary zoning
ordinances are unilateral regulations requiring developers to charge a
predetermined amount, and therefore are rent controlling devices.140
Moreover, the municipality has the power to reduce or waive the ordinance,
thus providing further evidence that the technique acts like rent control.141
However, rent control and inclusionary zoning differ in four material
ways. First, "[r]ent control requires existing units to be rented at below-
market rates whereas inclusionary zoning mandates the construction of new
[affordable] housing units, usually in return for an incentive."l 42 Second, the
execution and administration of inclusionary zoning programs and rent
control ordinances are different.143  Inclusionary zoning programs are
generally controlled by guidelines created by HUD.'" Third, affordable
housing inclusionary zoning programs are broader in scope than rent control
undeveloped land.
Benjamin Powell & Edward Stringham, "The Economics ofInclusionary Zoning Reclaimed": How
Effective Are Price Controls?, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 471, 478 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
138. Nadia I. El Mallakh, Does the Costa-Hawkings Act Prohibit Local Inclusionary Zoning
Programs?, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1847, 1873 (2001). The implementation of rent control is enacted by
the city council, board of supervisors, or other municipal legislative bodies. Id. The legislative body
sets the rental prices as of the day of enactment and in the future adjusts the rents "in a variety of
ways, such as by a local rent control board or the consumer price index." Id; Kari Anne Gallagher,
Comment, Yee v. City of Escondido: Will Mobile Homes Provide an Open Road for the Nollan
Analysis?, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 821, 821 n.l (1992) (citing Richard E. Blumberg et al., The
Emergence ofSecond Generation Rent Controls, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 240 (1974)).
139. The affordable housing plan in St. Johns, Florida requires that there be a "sales price cap of
$92,490 for an existing house or $106,017 for new construction (including house and land)."
STRATEGIC PLANNING GROUP, INC., ST. JOHNS COUNTY AFFORDABLE HOUSING REPORT 145
(2002), available at http://www.co.st-johns.fl.us/BCC/growth management/media/Housing/
FinalReportMay23.pdf; see also UW Economics Intern, Inclusionary Zoning: More Problems, Less
Solutions, and Making Markets More Inefficient All at One Time, PAX AMERICANA INSTITUTE, Mar.
26, 2007, http://www.paxamerica.org/index.php?option=comcontent&view-article&id=81
("Inclusionary Zoning places a price ceiling on rents and sale prices of 'affordable housing' required
to be constructed on new developments.").
140. See Apartment Ass'n of S. Cent. Wis.. v. City of Madison, 2006 WI App 192, 296 Wis. 2d
173, 722 N.W.2d 614.
141. Id.
142. See Mallakh, supra note 138, at 1873. Unlike inclusionary zoning ordinances, "rent control
does not aid in the construction of new affordable rental units." Id.
143. Id. Unlike inclusionary zoning ordinances, "rent control rates are set by a local legislative
body such as a local rent control board or by an annually prescribed percentage in the local rent
control act." Id.
144. Laura M. Padilla, Reflections on Inclusionary Housing and a Renewed Look at its Viability,
23 HOFSTRA L. REv. 539, 554 (1995) ("Qualification requirements for initial occupants of
inclusionary units vary from program to program, but are always tied to income (which is generally
modified based on family size according to HUD guidelines), and are usually adjusted for inflation
on an annual basis").
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policies.145  Fourth, in order to be eligible for affordable housing, each
candidate must prove that he or she fits within the "income guidelines
established by HUD for inclusionary zoning programs," whereas "anyone
can rent a rent-controlled unit."1 46
An even more appropriate classification is that mandatory inclusionary
zoning ordinances are a tax on development. It is argued that because the
municipality does not pay for the expenses of the inclusionary zoning
ordinance, the mandate is, in effect, a tax on the developers.147 Because the
developers must price the affordable housing units at well below market
price, they must forfeit the profits they would have made if the units were
sold at market-rate.148 Municipalities and states "do not pay for the cost of
producing the price-controlled units, so inclusionary zoning works like a tax
on builders." 49 Although inclusionary zoning programs work like a tax, the
fact that ordinances do not require monetary supplements or in-lieu fees
unless necessary means that "tax" is not a completely appropriate
characterization. 150
The fourth, and most suitable, characterization of mandatory
inclusionary zoning ordinances is an "exaction." Development exactions are
defined as "dedications of land to the public, installation of public
improvements, and [monetary payments] for public purposes that are
imposed by governmental entities upon developers of land as conditions of
development permission."15' Mandatory inclusionary zoning ordinances are
145. See Mallakh, supra note 138, at 1874. Inclusionary zoning can apply to rental units,
condominiums, and single-family developments, whereas "rent control only applies to rental
units ... [and, in turn,] inclusionary zoning programs potentially create more diverse forms of
affordable housing opportunities." Id.
146. Id.
147. See POWELL & STRINGHAM, supra note 10, at 17. "Inclusionary zoning effectively acts as a
tax on the production of market-rate units because developers must sell a percentage of units at a
loss to gain permits to sell market-rate units." Id.
148. Benjamin Powell & Edward Stringham, Op-Ed., Inclusionary Zoning Makes Housing Less
Affordable, S.F. Bus. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2004, http://sanfrancisco.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/
stories/2004/ll/22/editorial3.html. Powell and Stringham conducted a study and found that "in the
median city in the San Francisco Bay Area, builders must forgo $345,000 in revenue for each below-
market unit [and in] one quarter ofjurisdictions builders must forego more than $500,000 in revenue
for each below market-rate unit." Id
149. Id.
150. In-lieu fees are a part of some inclusionary zoning programs; however, the main purpose of
an inclusionary zoning program is to create affordable housing units within the same developments
as market-rate units, not simply contribute to a city housing trust fund. See infra notes 352-367 and
accompanying text.
151. See Lerman, supra note 116, at 396 n.108 (citing WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A.
WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.32 (3d ed. 2000)).
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"requirements in a zoning ordinance for setting aside a proportion of housing
units in a residential development for lower-income households."l5 2 In the
event that it is not feasible to create affordable units in the new
developments, these programs allow developers "to pay a fee in lieu of
providing units; provide units at another location; or provide land elsewhere
for the construction of affordable units."'1 Furthermore, politicians, courts,
advocates, and academics concede that affordable housing is a legitimate
state interest.154 Juxtaposing the definition of "exaction" and the definition
and characteristics of mandatory inclusionary zoning programs reveals that
one defines the other. Mandatory inclusionary zoning ordinances are
govemment enforced and are requirements for developers, as are
exactions.' 55  Mandatory inclusionary zoning ordinances are for public
purposes or state interests and are fees, money, land dedications, or public
improvements, as are exactions. 156 In fact, every characteristic of mandatory
inclusionary zoning ordinances fits neatly in the definition of exactions as
provided by the treatise.'57 Therefore, as an exaction, the courts must apply
an intermediate level of scrutiny.'18
Cities and towns use developer exactions as a strategy to offset the burdens of new
development on the community. Exactions contribute to regional equity by ensuring that
a new development pays a fair share of the public costs that they generate. Exactions
consist of a developer's payment of "impact fees." These fees are used to fund new
schools and parks; construction or maintenance of public infrastructure directly
connected to the new development; and off-site improvements and services. Exactions
are levied on developers in exchange for the approvals to proceed with a project.
PolicyLink, Development Exactions, http://policylink.info/EDTK/Exactions (last visited Nov. 18,
2009).
152. PORTER, supra note 6, at 212 n.1.
153. KAREN DESTOREL BROWN, BROOKINGS INST. CTR. ON URBAN & METRO. POLICY,
EXPANDING AFFORDABLE HOUSING THROUGH INCLUSIONARY ZONING: LESSONS FROM THE
WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA 2 (2001), available at http://www.brookings.edu/reports/
2001/10metropolitanpolicybrown.aspx.
154. See Stewart Ain, Making Housing Affordable, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2003, at 8 ("There is a
vital state interest to having local goverrunents respond to the need for local affordable
housing...." (quoting Assemblyman Thomas P. DiNapoli)); see also Home Builders Ass'n v. City
of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60, 64 (Ct. App. 2001) ("First, we have no doubt that creating affordable
housing for low and moderate income families is a legitimate state interest."); Lerman, supra note
116, at 395 ("As mentioned above, the basic adoption of inclusionary zoning statutes causes the
creation of affordable housing to be viewed as a legitimate state interest. Once the local ordinance is
proven to be a legitimate state interest, the question becomes whether the developer can be forced to
provide the required affordable units." (footnotes omitted)); Daniel J. Curtin, Jr. & Elizabeth M.
Naughton, Inclusionary Housing Ordinance Is Not Facially Invalid and Does Not Result in a
Taking, 34 URB. LAW. 913, 915 (2002).
155. See Lerman, supra note 116, at 396 n.108 (citing WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A.
WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.32 (3d ed. 2000)).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Jane C. Needleman, Note, Exactions: Exploring Exactly When Nollan and Dolan Should be
Triggered, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1563, 1564 (2006) ("The potential for government leveraging and
abuse is great in the development permit context, rendering the heightened scrutiny demanded by
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1. With an Exaction Comes Nollan and Dolan Heightened Scrutiny
The legal analysis of an exaction relies heavily on two cases: Nollan v.
California Coastal Commissionl5 9 and Dolan v. City of Tigard.'" As
mentioned earlier, an exaction occurs when the government imposes specific
conditions on a particular piece of private property that result in a change to
the use of that property by the owner.'6 ' This particular form of taking
requires that there be an essential nexus and rough proportionality between
the exaction demanded by the government and the harm done to the
community by the new development.162  The criteria necessary for an
exaction to avoid a takings charge are enumerated by the U.S. Supreme
Court in the Nollan'6 3 and Dolan6' cases.
In the Nollan case, approval of a construction permit for a beach house
was subject to a dedication, by the owner, of a public access easement across
the beach-front property.6 s The California Coastal Commission defended
the condition on the grounds that the existence of the easement would
eliminate any "psychological barriers" to using the state beach.' 66  Mr.
Nollan, the owner of the beach-front property, claimed the easement equated
to a taking of private property for public use without just compensation in
direct violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.'67
The Court held in favor of the property owners.168 For a government
action to be valid, there must be a connection between the means and ends of
the provision.169  Placing a condition on the approval and issuance of a
construction permit is a valid land use regulation if denying the permit
Nollan and Dolan necessary." (footnote omitted)).
159. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
160. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
161. See Lerman, supra note 116, at 396 n.108 (citing WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A.
WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.32 (3d ed. 2000)).
162. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (holding that "the lack of nexus between the condition and the
original purpose of the building restriction" is a fatal deficiency for the ordinance); Dolan, 512 U.S.
at 391 (holding that a "term such as 'rough proportionality' best encapsulates what we hold to be the
requirement of the Fifth Amendment").
163. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 825.
164. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 374.
165. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827.
166. Id. at 828-29.
167. Id at 828.
168. Id at 841-42.
169. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. The government's power to forbid particular land uses in order to
advance some legitimate police power purpose includes the power to condition such use upon some
concessions by the owner, even a concession of property rights, so long as the condition furthers the
same governmental purpose advanced as justification for prohibiting the use. Id. at 831-37.
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would substantially further a governmental purpose. 70 In this case, the
justifications proposed by the state for the condition were disfavored by the
Court, which found that the condition did not serve a public purpose related
to the permit requirement.' 7 ' There was no nexus between the condition on
the proposed construction to provide a lateral easement over the privately
owned portion of the beach and the state interest in providing access to the
public portion of the beach.172 Thus, the exaction constituted a taking of
private property without just compensation.7 3
The Nollan case introduced a new rule concerning a taking. There must
be an essential nexus between a legitimate state interest and a permit
condition.174 This results in exactions being subject to a "heightened
scrutiny" standard of review," as reaffirmed in Dolan.
In Dolan, a property owner applied to the city for a building permit to
increase the size of her store and pave the store's parking lot.'76  The
planning commission granted Dolan's permit application subject to "her
compliance with [a] dedication of land (1) for a public greenway along
Fanno Creek to minimize flooding that would be exacerbated by the
increases in impervious surfaces associated with her development and (2) for
a pedestrian/bicycle pathway intended to relieve traffic congestion in the
city's Central Business District." 77  Dolan alleged that the required
conditions "were not related to the proposed development, and, therefore ...
constituted an uncompensated taking of her property" in strict violation of
her Fifth Amendment rights.' 7 1
170. Id. at 831-37.
171. Id; see also id. at 841-42 (The Court, in its holding, emphasized that the government is "free
to advance its 'comprehensive program,' if it wishes, by using its power of eminent domain for [a]
'public purpose'; but if it wants an easement across the Nollan's property, it must pay for it."
(citation omitted)).
172. Id.; see Needleman, supra note 158, at 1567 (noting that Justice Scalia concluded that
"[a]llowing the public already present on the beach to walk across the Nollans' private property
would not reduce any viewing obstacles from the street that would be created by the new house. The
absence of a nexus between the condition imposed by the Costal [sic] Commission and its stated
purpose made it likely that the municipality's purpose was to obtain an easement without having to
pay for it.") (footnote omitted).
173. Id.
174. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. The Nollan Court reaffirmed that permanent physical
occupation constitutes a compensable taking. Id. at 831-32 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 432,434 (1982)).
175. Id. at 841. Some state courts have held that this standard does not extend to ordinances of
general application (e.g., zoning ordinances) but only to adjudicatory actions of regulatory bodies
(e.g., determinations of whether to grant a permit for development). See Needleman, supra note
158, at 1563-67.
176. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 379.
177. Id. at 374.
178. Id.
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The Court held in favor of Dolan. In its analysis, the Court established a
two part test. First, there must be an essential nexus between a legitimate
state interest and the permit condition." 9 If a nexus is found to exist, then
the court must "determine whether the degree of the exactions demanded by
the city's permit conditions bears the required relationship to the projected
impact of petitioner's proposed development."180 The municipality must
look at the project in question specifically and make a unique assessment of
the condition to determine if it is related to the project in both nature and
impact,18' and the condition must be roughly proportional to the impact of
the proposed development.182 The municipality in Dolan did not satisfy the
second prong of the two prong test, and the conditions were held to be
unconstitutional.183
Based on the criterion under both Nollan and Dolan, an exaction is
subject to a two pronged test. For a condition to be held constitutional under
heightened scrutiny, there must be an essential nexus between a legitimate
state interest and a permit condition, and its effect on the proposed
development must be roughly proportional to the development's impact on
the community.184 If these two prongs are not satisfied the court will strike
down the condition as unconstitutional.' 85
2. As an Exaction, an Inclusionary Zoning Program Must Pass the
Heightened Scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan
The textbook definition of exaction is articulated above; however, it is
important to thoroughly understand exactions beyond textbook definitions in
order to apply a proper Nollan/Dolan analysis. Exactions work on the
premise of "adverse impact" to the city or county. Externalities that are
introduced by new developments can overly burden existing infrastructure,
179. Id. at 385 ("In Nollan, we held that governmental authority to exact such a condition was
circumscribed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Under the well-settled doctrine of
'unconstitutional conditions,' the government may not require a person to give up a constitutional
right-here the right to receive just compensation when property is taken for a public use-in
exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the benefit sought has little
or no relationship to the property.").
180. Id. at 388.
181. Id. at 391.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 393-95. The Court stated that the city had not shown the "required reasonable
relationship" between the flood plain easement and the property owner's proposed new building. Id
at 394-95.
184. Id. at 409.
185. Id.
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existing social services, and other municipal resources. A simple illustration
is a new subdivision's impact on schools in the community. If a town
allows the development of a 100 home subdivision, the increase in homes in
the area will increase the demand on the local school district to provide
education for the residents in the new subdivision. Therefore, the city would
require that the developer build a new school in or near the subdivision to
diminish the adverse impact the subdivision would have on the local school
district. This is an exaction: the dedication of land to the public (in this case
a school) imposed by the city as condition for development permission in
order to lessen the negative impact the development has on the
community.186
Moreover, exactions work in tandem with the city or county's municipal
power to deny development.'87 If a builder cannot comply with an exaction
the municipality has the right to deny development.188 This ability is critical
to the power of an exaction and is therefore integral to the analysis of the
exaction. What this means is that for a proper nexus to exist the denial of
building permits must be in line with the overall goals or purpose of the
exaction. For example, if the developer cannot build the new school then the
city cannot allow the developer to adversely affect the schools already in
operation and must deny building permits. It is clear in this example that the
purpose of the exaction is to limit excessive burden on the local schools.
This exaction properly operates along the line of its ultimate goal. If a
subdivision is built, the developer must build a school to alleviate the
adverse impact on the community. Furthermore, denying the building
permits will also achieve this goal by not allowing development and,
therefore, limiting the introduction of new residents to the community.
Because mandatory inclusionary zoning programs are exactions, one
must identify the adverse impact to be alleviated by the program and couple
this with a Nollan and Dolan review. The impact of a Nollan and Dolan
analysis on mandatory inclusionary zoning ordinances is best examined by
applying their tests to the elements of the mandatory inclusionary zoning
programs.'" First, it must be clear that the municipality, in denying the
186. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
187. The decision of Village ofEuclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), established the
constitutionality of municipal discretion to grant or deny development permits, thus, "[i]f existing
zoning regulations do not allow developers to build as of right, developers must seek municipal
approval in order to proceed with construction." Michael T. Kersten, Exactions, Severability and
Takings: When Courts Should Sever Unconstitutional Conditions from Development Permits, 27
B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 279, 280 (2000).
188. Id
189. As previously stated, the first step is to determine if the ordinance or condition being
imposed on the developer has a "nexus with the state's legitimate purpose for prohibiting the
development." See DaRosa, supra note 5, at 474 (footnote omitted). Furthermore, the second step
requires that there be a rough proportionality between the exaction and the impact or burden to be
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developers the opportunity to use their property at their discretion, is
furthering the purpose for which the ordinance, program, or regulation was
enacted to accomplish.' 90 Determining the appropriate purpose of the
program and finding a nexus is essential to the success of the ordinance and
can prove to be rather troublesome. There seem to be two possible purposes
for mandatory inclusionary zoning requirements: (1) creating more
affordable housing and (2) setting aside land for affordable housing.' 9'
Examining the first possible purpose, it is clear that requiring developers
to build affordable housing will in fact create more affordable housing.
However, it is not clear how denying a developer a building permit and the
use of the developer's property would increase the supply of affordable
housing.192  If the goal is to create more affordable housing, it is
unquestionably counterproductive to deny a builder a permit.'93 Therefore,
the nexus test fails because it is not clear how denying a developer a permit
accomplishes the ultimate goal of creating more affordable housing.194
created by the proposed development. Id. at 476-77.
190. Id
191. Id. at 475-76.
192. As previously explained:
The point of affordable housing requirements is to increase the supply of housing that
moderate and lower income families can afford. Denying a residential development
permit out of hand may achieve other purposes: protection of the environment,
preservation of a "view shed," preservation of a neighborhood's character or available
infrastructure, for example. But prohibiting a residential development certainly does
nothing to increase the supply of affordable housing. Thus framed, under the nexus test,
there seems to be a constitutional disjuncture between the conceivable legitimate
purposes for denying a developer building permits for a residential development and the
purpose for affordable housing conditions a permit on the developer's entitlements.
Id. at 475 (footnote omitted).
193. Id Market-rate production makes affordable housing production possible, and a depression
of the former ultimately depresses the latter. This relationship relies primarily on affordable
housing's dependence on subsidies from the taxes collected from market-value homes. See Kutner,
supra note 8. In inclusionary zoning, the relationship is even more dependant as the definition of
inclusionary zoning illustrates. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. Many affordable housing
advocates illustrate the benefit of this reliance and propose steps to exploit the relationship.
Community groups can take advantage of development pressures either to create
housing directly or to gain financial resources for subsidizing affordability in other
developments. Most typically, this involves requiring or providing incentives for market-
rate development to include a percentage of below-market rate units in new
developments. Alternatively, local land use policies can require fees from new
development or even land donations to enable others to develop subsidized affordable
housing.
PolicyLink, Affordable Housing Development 101, http://www.policylink.info/EDTK/AHIOI/
GoalsToTools.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2009).
194. See DaRosa, supra note 5, at 475.
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As enumerated earlier, the second possible purpose for a mandatory
inclusionary zoning program is to secure land set-asides for future affordable
housing projects.195  However, dedicating property to offset the
development's impact on nonrenewable land resources invokes a heightened
scrutiny standard that is satisfied only if "the legislative purpose were stated
to be the preservation of residentially zoned land for housing for moderate
and lower income developments." If the ordinance lacks this language,
then the nexus requirement has not been met.'97  Under the nexus test in
Nollan:
[I]t is likely that most affordable housing exactions (whether
requiring a developer to build affordable units alongside his market
units, or to pay for someone else to build them, or to dedicate
buildable lots to the government)[] would not achieve the same
purpose as the outright prohibition of a residential development to
the degree that the nexus test requires.'98
Thus, as previous postulated, most mandatory inclusionary zoning
ordinances fail constitutionally.
As required by Dolan, the second test is whether the required dedication
is roughly proportional both in nature and extent to the impact of the
proposed development.'" Thus, the requirements and restrictions on the
developer must be proportionate to the impact of the new development on
the community.200 This requires municipalities to evaluate the overall
impact the new development will have on: (1) the municipality's land
resources; (2) the affordable housing to market-rate housing ratio; and (3)
the economic impact on the community, and determine if the elements of its
mandatory inclusionary zoning ordinance burden the developer in proportion
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. A possible way to satisfy the Nexus test in Nollan is incorporate explicit language into
the zoning ordinance that would prohibit the construction of any non-mixed-income developments.
Id. at 476. Thus, "[a]ny residential development that did not include affordable housing units would
be prohibited." Therefore, by actively "placing affordable housing conditions on entitlements [the
ordinance] would have the required nexus with denying development altogether-no economically
unmixed residential projects would be allowed." Id.
198. Id. at 475.
199. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 388 (holding that a municipality must "determine
whether the degree of the exactions demanded by the city's permit conditions bears the required
relationship to the projected impact of petitioner's proposed development").
200. Id. at 389 (The Court indicated that the relationship would have to be shown by the
municipality, not the plaintiff, and that "generalized statements as to the necessary connection
between the required dedication and the proposed development" are insufficient. (citation omitted));
see also DaRosa, supra note 5, at 480. Therefore, a successful comparison hinges on the ability of
the municipality to reliably quantify both the burden placed on the developer and the impact the new
development will have on the community. Id.
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to the project's impact.20 1 Obviously, this individualized analysis requires
an impact study by the municipality and a narrowly tailored purpose202
written into the program with which to compare "developer impact" and the
objective of the ordinance.203
The rationale for mandatory inclusionary zoning ordinances relies on the
theory that the creation of market-rate units will supply a growing
population with much needed housing, and the influx of middle to upper
income individuals will eventually attract lower-income individuals, who
will, in turn, require affordable housing. 204 Thus, the creation of new
developments "negatively impacts the pre-existing need for affordable
homes," and requires the new developments to include affordable units to
undo or counter the negative impact of the new development.205 The major
issue in this scenario, under the Dolan test, is determining the actual impact
on affordable housing caused by the developments and the corresponding
relationship the ordinance has to that impact.2 06
The Dolan test requires courts to weigh the burden on developers and
builders against the ordinance's benefit to the city or county.207 Footing the
bill for affordable housing can be extremely burdensome,208 and to pass the
Dolan test the municipality would have to investigate and determine if the
actual impact of the mandatory inclusionary ordinance is sufficiently
proportional to the developer's heavy burden of subsidizing the affordable
units.209 The parameters of this relationship are crucial because the Dolan
201. See DaRosa, supra note 5, at 482. "Dolan, however, appears to require the government to
make individualized determinations demonstrating that its requirements, as applied to an individual
developer, are proportional in nature and extent to the harm created by a new residential
development." Id.
202. See supra notes 190-198 and accompanying text.
203. See DaRosa, supra note 5, at 482 ("[G]eneralizations will not steer clear of a takings problem
as the Dolan court indicated."); see also Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
204. See DaRosa, supra note 5, at 475.
205. Id. at 478 (footnote omitted).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See infra notes 413-418 and accompanying text.
209. The question of when government action constitutes an overwhelming burden is illustrated
by the following:
It looks like a taking when a government makes an entrepreneur subsidize affordable
units when there is little or no hope of his making a profit on those units . . . . For
example, in setting an affordable price, if the developer lost all hope of profit from the
affordable units, a twenty percent exaction would result in roughly a twenty percent
reduction of the gain the developer expected from "use" of his property, e.g. through
developing it. The question is, is this too great of a burden? . . . Viewed as a partial
deprivation of profit, this is probably not going too far. But viewed through the lens of a
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test does not allow for speculation or guesswork. 2 0 Therefore, the city or
county must demonstrate "that affordable homes would, in fact, be built on
that land" occupied by the developer's project to show that "the impact on
the need for affordable housing is [not] purely speculative."2 11 This
requirement is extremely hard to prove and to fit within the bounds of the
Dolan standard. Although it is reasonable to conclude that building market-
rate units may result in less land for affordable units,2 12 proving that "the
property supply impact that a proposed residential development may have on
the need for affordable housing seems at best speculative and at worst
impossible to do."213 Overall, the burden of proof under Dolan is quite
formidable and, as demonstrated here, appears to be too heavy for
municipalities to justify their mandatory inclusionary zoning ordinances.
It is evident from the above argument that satisfying the Nollan nexus
requirement is questionable because the purpose, or purposes, for the
ordinance may not be achieved by denying the builder the opportunity to use
his or her property at will. 2 14 Furthermore, Dolan's burden of proof standard
can prove to be impossible to achieve for the governments that institute
mandatory inclusionary zoning ordinances.215  Thus, it appears that these
programs will not qualify under Nollan/Dolan scrutiny, resulting in a taking,
and if due compensation was not given to the developers, an unconstitutional
taking.2 16 Although the characteristics of these ordinances are more similar
to exactions than any other category argued above, the most heralded case
land dedication, because ten percent was too much in Dolan, surely twenty or thirty
percent would be too much ....
DaRosa, supra note 5, at 479.
210. Idat480.
211. Id. at 478. This analysis undermines the argument that characterizing a mandatory
inclusionary zoning ordinance as an impact fee escapes constitutional criticism. See generally
Lerman, supra note 116 (claiming that these ordinances are impact fees and, thus, are not held to
Nollan/Dolan scrutiny).
212. See DaRosa, supra note 5, at 481 ("It is conceivable that residential developments do
increase the need for affordable housing units, because unaffordable residential developments use up
precious land resources for the benefit of the very few . . . .").
213. Id Dolan dismisses speculation and unsupported projections as insufficient evidence of
rough proportionality between the impact of the development and the amount exacted from the
developer. Id. While the burden on the developer is rather simple to determine, given that the Court
determines an appropriate return on investment, the impact is very difficult to determine. Id It is
very hard to predict how much affordable housing would be built on the proposed site but for the
new development, and such predictions boil down to unacceptable speculation and unsupported
projections. The Court has rejected this type of generalization as inadequate justification for
exactions of private property without compensation. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391
(1994) (holding that the standard does not require a "precise mathematical calculation," but "the city
must make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in
nature and extent to the impact of the propose development").
214. See supra notes 190-98 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 200-13 and accompanying text.
216. See infra notes 258-345 and accompanying text.
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by inclusionary zoning advocates and proponents of mandatory programs
disagrees with this classification and the application of the heightened
217scrutiny.
3. Criticism of Home Builders Association
The strongest case for mandatory inclusionary zoning advocates is
Home Builders Association.218 This case involved an inclusionary ordinance
that required real estate developers to set aside ten percent of all newly
constructed residential units as affordable housing.2 9 The ordinance offered
three possible alternatives to strict compliance: (1) "developers of single-
family units may, at their option, satisfy the so called inclusionary
requirement through an 'alternative equivalent proposal' such as a
dedication of land, [in-lieu payments or fees], or the construction of
affordable units on another site"; (2) "[d]evelopers of multifamily units may
also satisfy the [ten] percent requirement through an 'alternative equivalent
proposal' if the city council, in its sole discretion, determines that the
proposed alternative results in affordable housing opportunities equal to or
greater than those created by the basic inclusionary requirement"; and (3) "a
residential developer may choose to satisfy the inclusionary requirement by
paying an in-lieu fee, [which] [d]evelopers of single-family units may
choose this option by right, while developers of multi-family units are
permitted this option if the city council, again in its sole discretion,
approves." 220 In an attempt to assist developments, this program apportions
a variety of benefits "including expedited processing, fee deferrals, loans or
grants, and density bonuses that allow more intensive development." 22'
Last, the ordinance stipulates that developers can appeal for a "reduction,
adjustment, or complete waiver of obligations under the ordinance 'based
upon the absence of any reasonable relationship or nexus between the impact
of the development and . .. the inclusionary requirement."'
222
217. See Lerman, supra note 116, at 406-07 ("The success of Napa's ordinance may have opened
the door for this type of mandatory program to be used more frequently because of its proven
constitutionality.").
218. Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60, 60 (Ct. App. 2001).
219. Id
220. Id. at 62.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 63. "All fees generated through this option are deposited into a housing trust fund, and
may only be used to increase and improve the supply of affordable housing in City." Id. at 62.
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The Home Builder's Association of Northern California (HBA) sued the
City of Napa on the grounds that the enforcement of the ordinance resulted
in an impermissible taking under both state and federal law.223 The
California Supreme Court upheld the ordinance as valid because the
ordinance "provides significant benefits to those who comply with its terms,[d]evelopments that include affordable housing are eligible for expedited
processing, fee deferrals, loans or grants, and density bonuses ... [and]
[m]ore critically, the ordinance permits a developer to appeal for a reduction,
adjustment, or complete waiver of the ordinance's requirements."224 The
court denied the HBA's Nollan/Dolan analysis on the grounds that such a
test is reserved for land use bargains between an owner and a regulatory
body,2 5 and this ordinance should be analyzed not as an "individualized
assessment imposed as a condition of development," but as a generally
applicable zoning regulation. 26
As stated above, this opinion set inclusionary zoning ordinances outside
the jurisdiction of the Nollan and Dolan tests. However, analyzing the court
opinion exposes some questionable statements and assertions. First, the
court denied the use of the Nollan/Dolan analysis stating that such a test is
reserved for bargains between an owner and a municipality. 227 The court
made this declaration despite the structure of the ordinance in question,
which allowed developers to petition and negotiate with the municipality
and propose an alternative plan.228 In fact, approval of this plan is at the sole
discretion of the municipality. 229 Inherently, programs that allow developers
to propose their own plans will require municipalities to look at a
developer's proposal on an individualized basis and eventually make a deal
with the developer before issuing a building permit. If a developer proposes
a land grant as an alternative to the City of Napa's ten percent set-aside, the
City may respond with a fee proposal instead. Such exchanges are
essentially bargaining negotiations. 2 30 Therefore, any program that allows
223. Id. at 63.
224. Id. at 64.
225. Id. at 65.
226. Id. at 64.
227. Id at 196.
228. Id. at 192.
229. Id.
230. Bargaining is a form of distributive negotiation. The Negotiation Experts, Bargaining,
http://www.negotiations.com/definition/bargaining (last visited Nov. 19, 2009) ("Bargaining is a
simple form of negotiation process that is both competitive and positional. Bargaining predominates
in one-time negotiations and often revolves around a single issue-usually price. One party usually
attempts to gain advantage over another to obtain the best possible agreement."). This definition
comprehensively describes the tone of negotiations between builders and municipalities. Id. Both
wants something from the other, and the city or county wants the most from the builders with the
least amount of compromise and vice-versa. Id.
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private proposals as alternatives to the established criteria,23 1 in and of itself,
invites an interaction between public and private entities that equates to
bargaining and requires an individualized assessment, thus triggering a
Nollan/Dolan analysis.232 The City of Napa's program is no different.
Although the fundamental effect of the ordinance is applied to all
development in the City of Napa,233 the inclusion of alternatives in the
ordinance narrows the application of the ordinance when a private entity
234proposes an alternative.
The Nollan and Dolan test requires an intermediate standard of scrutiny,
and, as the Home Builders Association argues, the City of Napa's ordinance
is "invalid under Nollan and Dolan because there is no 'essential nexus' or
'rough proportionality' between the exaction required by the ordinance, and
the impacts caused by [the] development of property. 235 Therefore, the
structure and procedural process written into the City of Napa's ordinance
fatally evoke the Nollan and Dolan test, which determines that the program
does not satisfy the required heightened scrutiny and is, therefore,
unconstitutional.
B. Second Challenge: Beyond Nollan and Dolan Scrutiny, Mandatory
Inclusionary Zoning Ordinances Fall Short Both Constitutionally and of
Their Intended Purpose
The social and economic theories behind mandatory inclusionary
ordinances are not in and of themselves unconstitutional; however, the
programs in use today might amount to an illegal taking and have proven to
be counterproductive to their intended purpose. There are three basic
mandatory program formats: (1) no benefits to developers; (2) benefits to
developers; and (3) alternatives to set-asides. All programs consist of one of
these formats, while some consist of a combination of these, such as
alternatives but no benefits.236 As explained below, certain mandatory
231. In Douglas Porter's essay Promise and Practice of Inclusionary Zoning, the author lists
sixteen random communities that have enacted inclusionary zoning programs, eleven of which allow
for alternatives. Porter, supra note 6, at 222-25.
232. Constitutional Law-Fifth Amendment Takings Clause-California Court of Appeal Finds
Nollan's and Dolan's Heightened Scrutiny Inapplicable to Inclusionary Zoning Ordinance, 115
HARv. L. REv. 2058, 2061 (2002).
233. Home Builders Ass'n, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 65-66.
234. See infra note 346 and accompanying text.
235. Home Builders Ass 'n, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 65.
236. See Porter, supra note 6, at 222-25. Boston, Massachusetts allows a tax abatement and "off-
site [construction] if 15% affordable," whereas Chula Vista, California allows a density bonus but no
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inclusionary zoning characteristics can create the exact environments that
the inclusionary zoning policy seeks to abolish.237 Furthermore, there is a
strong argument that programs that lack proper compensation amount to an
unconstitutional taking.238  However, before delving into the takings
argument, it is essential to understand some basic takings principles.
1. What is a "Taking" and When Is it Unconstitutional?
Fundamentally, since the mid 1920s, 239 state and local governments
have been able to engage in land use planning that affects private citizens
and private land so long as it "substantially advance[s] legitimate state
interests" and does not "den[y] an owner economically viable use of his
land."240 These principles are rooted in the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, which states that "[n]o person shall . . . be deprived
of ... property, without due process of law ... nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation." 241 If government policies
or government programs either actually or effectively deprive a private
citizen, organization, or entity of the use of private property without just
compensation, then the program or policy results in an unconstitutional
taking.242 To understand the basics of a "takings argument," it is best to
break down the elements of the Fifth Amendment.
alternatives. Id.
237. See infra notes 346-76 and accompanying text.
238. See infra notes 239-345 and accompanying text.
239. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), is considered the genesis of
modem zoning practices. In that case, Euclid, a suburb of Cleveland, tried to inhibit Cleveland's
industrial growth from swallowing the small village by zoning out certain types of infrastructure and
using them in specific portions of the village. Id. at 379-85. The Court held that the zoning
ordinance was not an unreasonable extension of the village's police power or arbitrary on its face,
and thus it was not unconstitutional. Id. at 396-97.
240. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005). In that case, Hawaii enacted a
statute that capped the amount of rent oil companies could charge to its lessee/dealers, and the
respondent "brought this suit seeking a declaration that the rent cap effected an unconstitutional
taking of its property and an injunction against application of the cap to its stations." Id. at 528. The
Court enumerated four scenarios that will constitute a taking: (1) a permanent physical occupation of
the property (Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982));
(2) "regulations that completely deprive an owner of all economically beneficial use of her property"
(Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)); (3) a regulatory taking that causes
severe economic impact without adequate justification per the standards set forth in Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); and (4) an exaction or required dedication of
property so onerous as to constitute a physical taking (Nollan and Dolan). Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538-
48.
241. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
242. Id. The government has tremendous eminent domain abilities provided by its inherent police
powers; thus, the "Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public
use without just compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960).
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a. What Counts as "Public Use"?
The public use requirement in the Fifth Amendment demands that the
taking bear some rational relationship to the public interest or the public
good.243 The term "public use" is, unfortunately, extremely malleable,
resulting in numerous judicial interpretations. The United States Supreme
Court has held that public use includes, among other things, clearing
blighted areas244 and non-blighted areas, 245 reducing the potential harms of a
real estate oligopoly,246 and setting up infrastructure for land irrigation.247
The ambiguity and competitive interpretations of the clause are even more
divergent and conflicting in the state courts.248 For example, almost each
state has a different definition and criteria for the term "blighted" and
invokes eminent domain under competing circumstances. 249 Local benches
243. See generally Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). A non-exhaustive list of public
purposes includes: "[p]ublic safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, [and] law and
order...." Id.
244. See id. at 35. In Berman, the Court equated public use with public purpose and reviewed the
legislative judgment in terms of the undemanding rational basis test. Id
245. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). The wave of anxiety began with the
Court's decision in Kelo, holding that governments were entitled to take private homes when the city
embarked upon economic development plans. Id. at 489. Private citizens sued the City of New
London, Connecticut, because by decree, the municipality enacted its eminent domain powers and
condemned an area of privately owned homes in order to propagate a comprehensive redevelopment
plan. Id. at 473-74. The Court held that the community would benefit from the economic expansion
and rejuvenation, and, therefore, the plans were a permissible public use under the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 486-89.
246. See Hawaiian Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 229 (1984). Landowners sought to have
an act that "created a land condemnation scheme whereby title in real property is taken from lessors
and transferred to lessees in order to reduce the concentration of land ownership" declared
unconstitutional. Id. The court held "(1) The District Court was not required to abstain from
exercising its jurisdiction, [and] (2) The Act does not violate 'public use' requirement of the Fifth
Amendment for taking of private property." Id. at 230.
247. See Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158 (1896).
248. Lynda J. Oswald, Public Uses and Non-Uses: Sinister Schemes, Improper Motives, and Bad
Faith in Eminent Domain Law, 35 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 45, 53 (2008).
249. Compare Yonkers Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 37 N.Y.2d 478 (1975) (holding that
"blighted" areas include areas of improper land use and unwise planning) with San Franciscans
Upholding the Downtown Plan v. City of San Francisco, 102 Cal. App. 4th 656, 698-99 (2002)
(holding that for an area to be found blighted, "[i]t must be: (1) predominantly urbanized; (2)
characterized by one or more statutorily defined conditions of physical blight; (3) characterized by
one or more statutorily defined conditions of economic blight; and (4) affected by a cumulative
effect of physical and economic blight so prevalent and so substantial that it causes a reduction of or
a lack of proper utilization of the area to such an extent that it constitutes a serious physical and
economic burden on the community which cannot be reasonably expected to be reversed or
alleviated by private enterprise or government action, or both, without redevelopment" (citations
omitted)). For extensive research on the definition of "blighted," see Jonathan M. Purver,
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tend to take a broad view, and "public use is treated as coterminous with
public advantage or public purpose, which allows the acquisition of private
property to further the public good or general welfare, or to secure a public
benefit."25 0 The disorderly medley of local interpretations remains because
the Court defers to municipalities and local authorities in defining "public
good" to combat slum neighborhoods, blighted areas, and economic loss. 25 I
In 2005, the Court underscored its lenient interpretation of public use in
Kelo v. City of New London.25 2  Public use was deemed to include any
6C ,253
"public purpose. In essence, legislation with any conceivable rationality
is considered a public purpose and thus a bonafide public use.254 The Kelo
decision enraged a significant portion of the public by holding that "non-use
takings are not constitutionally prohibited on their face," and granting
legislative bodies the power to utilize eminent domain to achieve any
outcome they desire and to obstruct any use they deem undesirable.2 55
All inclusionary zoning programs can generally satisfy the public
purpose clause of the Fifth Amendment. As stated in Home Builders
Association, it is a legitimate state interest to have affordable housing,256 and
courts, academics, and advocates claim that requiring developers and
market-rate homebuyers to fund affordable housing units helps increase the
affordable housing supply. 257
Annotation, What Constitutes "Blighted Area" Within Urban Renewal and Redevelopment Statutes,
45 A.L.R. 3d 1096 (1972 & Supp. 2009).
250. Oswald, supra note 248, at 53; see also 2A JuLius L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT
DOMAIN § 7.01(1) (3d ed. 2009). The definition of public use can be stretched to mean anything in
the pursuit of, or favorable to, the prosperity of the community, up to and including "[a]ny exercise
of eminent domain which tends to enlarge resources, increase industrial energies, or promote the
productive power of any considerable number of inhabitants" of a community. SACKMAN, supra, §
7.02(3).
251. See Oswald, supra note 248, at 53.
252. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 479 (2005). The majority stated that "this
'Court long ago rejected any literal requirement that condemned property be put into use for the
general public."' Id. (citation omitted).
253. See id at 478-81 (holding that the Court does not apply a narrow definition of public use).
254. See id. at 488 ("When the legislature's purpose is legitimate and its means are not irrational,
our cases make clear that empirical debates over the wisdom of takings-no less than the debates
over the wisdom of other kinds of socioeconomic legislation-are not to be carried out in the federal
courts." (citation omitted)).
255. See Oswald, supra note 248, at 55-56.
The significance of Kelo for non-use takings lies in its two-fold message that: (1)
legislative determinations of public use and need are entitled to substantial judicial
deference; and (2) the political process, as well as the judiciary and the Constitution, has
an important role to play in reining in takings that are inappropriate or unwarranted.
Id. at 56; see also Kelo, 545 U.S. at 482-83, 489.
256. See Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60, 66 (Ct. App. 2001).
257. See DaRosa, supra note 5, at 474. Although this assumption seems logical, new studies have
shown the opposite. See infra note 307 and accompanying text.
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b. What Government Actions Require Equitable Compensation?
There are four scenarios in which government action or policy creates a
compensable taking: (1) regulatory takings; (2) regulations that deprive the
owner of all value in the property; (3) physical invasion; and (4)
exactions.5 The first three forms of compensable taking have been
sculpted by the Court through a series of decisions. Regulatory takings
occur when government regulations of the property leave no economically
viable use and the principal value of the land is lost.259 A regulation that
deprives an owner of all economically beneficial use of his property occurs
when a government action renders the property useless and of no value. 260 A
physical invasion occurs when the government physically invades private
property or allows others to physically invade the private property.261
Exactions are, as explained above, "dedications of land to the public,
installations of public improvements, and [payments] of money for public
purposes that [are] imposed by governmental entities upon developers of
land as conditions of development permission." 262
258. See supra note 240.
259. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (holding that whether a regulatory act
constitutes a taking requiring compensation depends on the extent of diminution in the value of the
property). Cf Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (holding that a state may not regulate
property into uselessness without paying compensation simply because the owner acquired the
property after the regulation became effective).
260. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). The Court in Lucas held that a
regulation that deprives an owner of all economically beneficial uses of land constitutes a taking
unless the proscribed use interests were not part of the title to begin with. Id. Thus, a law or decree
with the effect of depriving all economically beneficial use must do no more than duplicate the result
that could have been achieved in the courts under the law of nuisance. Id.
261. See Loretto v. Teleprompter CATV, 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982) (holding that "when the
'character of the governmental action' is a permanent physical occupation of property, our cases
uniformly have found a taking to the extent of the occupation, without regard to whether the action
achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner" (citation
omitted)); see also Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992) (holding that a flight path
established by the government that directed planes over Causby's chicken ranch which caused the
chickens to lay faulty eggs was a physical invasion and a taking that required compensation); Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (holding that the federal navigational servitude does not
create "a blanket exception to the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment" and an attempt by the
government "to create a public right of access to [an] improved pond goes so far beyond ordinary
regulation or improvement for navigation involved in typical riparian condemnation cases as to
amount to a taking requiring just compensation"); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)
(holding that the common law doctrine of owned "from the depths to the heavens" is not longer valid
in the modern word).
262. See Lerman, supra note 116, at 396 n.108 (quoting WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A.
WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.32 (3d ed. 2000)).
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This brings us to the inevitable question: Are mandatory inclusionary
programs a taking, and if so, are the developers compensated for the taking?
If the mandatory inclusionary program enforced by the municipality has an
"incentive" or "benefit" for the land developer, is it enough? The following
analysis is complementary to the exaction analysis above and attempts to
answer another question: If a mandatory inclusionary is not held to be an
exaction, as declared in Home Builders Association, can it still be an
unconstitutional taking? Before these questions can be answered, the proper
"takings analysis" must be determined.
2. Which "Takings" Standard Applies to Mandatory Inclusionary
Zoning Ordinances?
The Court has described two categories of regulatory takings: per se
takings and regulatory economic impact takings. 263 These two categories are
better classified as a two-tiered approach to a takings analysis because the
regulation in question can be analyzed first under per se, and if a taking is
not found, the regulation can be analyzed under regulatory economic impact.
The Court established two categories of regulatory action that are per se
takings for Fifth Amendment purposes. First, if a regulatory condition, no
matter how small, requires a private owner to endure permanent physical
invasion of his or her property, the government must provide just
compensation.2 6 Second, a regulation that completely deprives an owner of
"all economically beneficial us[e]" of his or her property triggers the
demand of just compensation.265 When a regulation does neither constitute a
physical invasion nor completely deprive the landowner of all its
economically beneficial use, the courts then analyze the regulatory takings
challenges under the standards set forth in Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. New York City.266 The regulatory economic impact standard under Penn
263. Per se takings are regulations that, on their face, constitute obvious deprivation of property
and no further analysis is necessary. See John C. Keene, When Does a Regulation "Go Too Far? "
The Supreme Court's Analytical Framework For Drawing the Line Between an Exercise of the
Police Power and an Exercise of the Power of Eminent Domain, 14 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REv. 397,
421 (2006); see generally Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003; see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 330 (2002).
264. See Loretto, 458 U.S. 419 (holding that a law requiring landlords to permit cable companies
to install cable facilities in apartment buildings effected a taking). The Court has characterized "a
permanent physical invasion as 'categorical' because there is no requirement for a court to strike a
balance among a number of actors, in contrast to the approach mandated in the first component of
the analytical framework discussed above." Keene, supra note 263, at 420.
265. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019. The Court held that the "government must pay just compensation
for such 'total regulatory takings,' except to the extent that 'background principles of nuisance and
property law' independently restrict the owner's intended use of the property. Lingle v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005) (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026-32).
266. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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Central factors in "[t]he economic impact on the claimant and, particularly,
the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-
backed expectations."267 Furthermore, the Penn Central analysis examines
the "character of the governmental action" which may be determinative of a
taking.26 8
Both categories (per se and regulatory economic impact) and all three
standards under Loretto, Lucas, and Penn Central focus upon the "severity
of the burden that government imposes upon private property rights."269 In
the Loretto context, any permanent physical invasion, no matter how small,
is the determining factor that undermines "the landowner's right to exclude,
'one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly
characterized as property."' 270  In the Lucas framework, the complete
deprivation of economic value is the determining factor and has been
decided to be, "from the landowner's point of view, the equivalent of a
,,271 'th ephysical appropriation. In the Penn Central context, the "magnitude of a
regulation's economic impact and the degree to which it interferes with
legitimate property interests" are the determining factors.272
Which of these three standards can be applied to mandatory inclusionary
zoning ordinances? Depending on the structure of program, the ordinance
can fall under the analysis of the Lucas standard and the Penn Central
standard. Why not Loretto? The Court in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency distinguishes physical
takings and regulatory takings.273 Inclusionary zoning ordinances, which are
267. Id. at 124.
268. Id.; see also Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539 ("[F]or instance whether it amounts to a physical
invasion or instead merely affects property interests through 'some public program adjusting the
benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good'-may be relevant in discerning
whether a taking has occurred." (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124)).
269. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539.
270. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 433 (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
271. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017.
272. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540.
273. 535 U.S. 302, 321-25 (2002). After defining a physical taking and regulatory taking, the
Court notes:
This longstanding distinction between acquisitions of property for public use, on the
one hand, and regulations prohibiting private uses, on the other, makes it inappropriate to
treat cases involving physical takings as controlling precedents for the evaluation of a
claim that there has been a "regulatory taking," and vice versa. For the same reason that
we do not ask whether a physical appropriation advances a substantial government
interest or whether it deprives the owner of all economically valuable use, we do not
apply our precedent from the physical takings context to regulatory takings claims.
Land-use regulations are ubiquitous and most of them impact property values in some
tangential way-often in completely unanticipated ways. Treating them all as per se
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clearly regulations imposed by the government, are set apart from physical
takings under Tahoe-Sierra, thus eliminating the Loretto standard for
inclusionary zoning ordinances and leaving the other two as the standards
that must be applied.274 But to what is the standard applied? The lots
subject to the ordinances? The property as a whole? The following section
investigates this inquiry.
3. The "Parcel as a Whole" Dilemma and the "Denominator" Issue
There are two ways to analyze a development. The first method
requires that the development be analyzed as one whole, continuous project.
Under this analysis, as long as the developer gets some return on his
investment of the overall project there is not a taking.275 Although no
compensation would be required under the Lucas standard, the Penn Central
standard may require compensation if the regulation essentially constitutes
eminent domain.276 On the other hand, the second method requires that the
development be analyzed not as an uninterrupted stretch of land full of
improvements but as a large grouping of lots within defined property lines.
Because each lot and unit is distinct, each must be uniquely improved to
cover its costs and turn a profit. Under this analysis, if the developer does
not get a return on a lot because of a local ordinance, then this is a taking.
The second method falls under the denominator issue and allows for the
application of the Lucas standard on a particular lot; however, the precedent
established under Penn Central and Tahoe-Sierra demands that a takings
analysis be applied to a "parcel as a whole."277
takings would transform government regulation into a luxury few governments could
afford. By contrast, physical appropriations are relatively rare, easily identified, and
usually represent a greater affront to individual property rights.
Id. at 323-24. Thus, the distinction erects a wall of separation of "physical" and "regulatory"
takings, subjecting each to their own takings standard.
274. Id. at 302, 303, 322, 332 (distinguishing condemnations and physical takings from regulatory
takings); see also supra note 273.
275. Under Lucas, the only way a depletion of value can be found to be a taking is if the
government action "deprives land of all economically beneficial use ... [unless] the nature of the
owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with."
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027 (emphasis added). Thus, if the developer gets some return on his
investment, then his property has not been completely depleted of value, and, thus, it is not a taking
under Lucas.
276. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136 ("We now must consider whether the interference with
appellants' property is of such a magnitude that 'there must be an exercise of eminent domain and
compensation to sustain [it].' (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922))).
277. In Lucas, the Court questioned the validity of the "parcel as a whole" standard when it
analyzed its own "deprivation of all economically feasible use" rule. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016
n.7. Under Penn Central, "'[t]aking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely
abrogated." Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130. In Tahoe-Sierra, the Court struck a blow against the
petitioner's attempt to divide up the contested property in saying: "Petitioners' 'conceptual
1084
[Vol. 37: 1039, 2010] Mandatory Inclusionary Zoning Practices
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
The Court in Penn Central established the "parcel as a whole" rule,
which requires courts to analyze the questioned property as one continuous
property in a takings analysis.278 Fourteen years later, the Court undermined
the Penn Central standard in Lucas by questioning the big picture approach
to a takings challenge,27 9 and then again in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island.280
But, the "parcel as a whole" rule was resuscitated most recently in Tahoe-
Sierra when the court refused to sever the property in question under a
takings analysis, thereby reviving the significance of the standards in Penn
Central.281
In Penn Central, the property at issue was a city landmark that was
protected under a city ordinance restricting development of the site in an
effort to maintain the landmark's original character.282 The property as a
whole was considered a landmark and the Court stated that one cannot
"divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine
whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated." 283 For
Penn Central, the parcel in question was the Grand Central Terminal in New
York City.284 The petitioners tried to separate the airspace from the terminal
severance' argument is unavailing because it ignores Penn Central's admonition that in regulatory
takings cases we must focus on the parcel as a whole." Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331 (quoting Penn
Central, 438 U.S. at 130); see also Richard J. Lazarus, Celebrating Tahoe-Sierra, 33 ENVTL. L. 1,
11(2003).
278. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130.
279. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016.
280. 533 U.S. 606 (2001); see also Lazarus, supra note 277, at 10 ("In Palazzolo, the Court noted
that it had expressed discomfort with the logic of this rule in Lucas and then seemed to cite favorably
to some scholarship of Professor Epstein that called for the rule's wholesale abandonment.").
281. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331 ("Petitioners' 'conceptual severance' argument is
unavailing because it ignores Penn Central's admonition that in regulatory takings cases we must
focus on 'the parcel as a whole.' We have consistently rejected such an approach to the
'denominator' question." (citation omitted)).
282. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 109-12.
283. Id. at 130.
284. See id. at 104 ("Under the Landmarks Law, the Grand Central Terminal (Terminal), which is
owned by the Penn Central Transportation Co. and its affiliates (Penn Central) was designated a
'landmark' and the block it occupies a 'landmark site.' Appellant Penn Central, though opposing the
designation before the Commission, did not seek judicial review of the final designation decision.
Thereafter appellant Penn Central entered into a lease with appellant UGP Properties, whereby UGP
was to construct a multistory office building over the Terminal. After the Commission had rejected
appellants' plans for the building as destructive of the Terminal's historic and aesthetic features,
with no judicial review thereafter being sought, appellants brought suit in state court claiming that
the application of the Landmarks Law had 'taken' their property without just compensation in
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and arbitrarily deprived them of their property
without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
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itself.2 85 The city ordinance designated that terminal to be a landmark, and
the petitioners could not disaggregate the terminal in an attempt to find a
286 Telnmtakings argument. The landmark, including the airspace, was one single
parcel. The language in Penn Central begs the question: What is a "parcel"?
The Department of Commerce under then Secretary Herbert Hoover
defined "parcel of land" in A Standard City Planning Enabling Act
(SCPEA): "for the purpose of sale or of building development: [e]very
division of a piece of land into two or more lots, parcels, or parts is, of
course, a subdivision."28 7 Thus, a parcel is a smaller piece of a larger part of
land, namely a subdivision. This definition is decisive in determining what
takings standard to apply.
A mandatory inclusionary zoning ordinance, although applied to an
entire development, targets specific product. The affordable component
does not apply to every lot uniformly, but rather to specific lots-specific
parcels. For example, the Boulder, Colorado mandatory program requires
that twenty percent of units created in a subdivision must be affordable.288
Therefore, in a tract of fifty single family homes or a complex of fifty
condominiums, there must be at least ten affordable units, and those units
will be sold at a lesser rate. The affordable requirement is not spread
throughout the entire subdivision, but dedicated to specified units.
Mandatory inclusionary zoning programs break subdivisions into two
categories: affordable units and market-rate units. Therefore, the Penn
Central "parcel as a whole" standard does not apply to the development on
the whole, but to each lot, for each lot is a "single parcel" per the SCPEA.289
This definition leads to three analytical scenarios: (1) the Lucas standard
applied to each and every lot; (2) the Penn Central economic standard being
applied to each and every lot; and (3) the Penn Central economic impact
standard applied to the subdivision as a whole. The third scenario is
inconsequential because the Court held that, as long as a developer receives
a reasonable return on an investment, a taking will not be found.290
285. See id. at 130.
286. See id. The Court's decision noted that "the New York City law does not interfere in any
way with the present uses of the Terminal." Id. at 136. Therefore, the airspace restriction "not only
permits but contemplates that appellants may continue to use the property precisely as it has been
used for the past 65 years: as a railroad terminal containing office space and concessions." Id. As
long as the law did not interfere with the primary use of the parcel, as was found here, Penn Central
would not "only . . . profit from the Terminal but also . . . obtain a 'reasonable return' on its
investment." Id.
287. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE ADVISORY COMM. ON CITY PLANNING & ZONING, A STANDARD
CITY PLANNING ENABLING ACT 6 n.6 (1928), available at http://myapa.planning.org/
growingsmart/pdf/CPEnablingActl 928.pdf.
288. See Porter, supra note 6, at 222.
289. See supra note 287.
290. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 121 (holding against a finding of a taking because the
appellants had failed to show that they could not earn a reasonable return on their investment in the
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Developers would be hard-pressed to show that selling only twenty percent
of their inventory at below market-rate would not result in a reasonable
return on the entire development.29' Conversely, the other two scenarios are
apt in analyzing mandatory inclusionary zoning programs. In applying the
Lucas standard, one must look at each lot/unit and if total economic
depletion is found, then there is a compensable taking.292 If no taking is
found under Lucas, then the adverse-economic-impact standard of Penn
Central can apply: Does the regulation unduly "interfere[] with distinct
investment-backed expectations"? 293  With both standards available to
evaluate mandatory inclusionary zoning ordinances, this Comment finds that
the programs in use today potentially fail under either standard. The first
program analyzed is the "no benefit" program.
4. "No Benefit" Programs Are an Unconstitutional Taking
Most proponents of inclusionary zoning programs support developer-
benefits in the form of incentives and offsets.294 However, there is an
influential minority of inclusionary zoning proponents who advocate that no
incentives or benefits are necessary, much less required. Some communities
that have mandatory inclusionary zoning programs do not offer incentives to
offset and subsidize the costs of creating below market-rate housing.2 95 In
Terminal itself).
291. Developers would have significantly more trouble arguing under Penn Central when the
zoning ordinance requires less than twenty percent affordable. Of the sixteen programs listed in
Douglas Porter's book, fourteen allow for set-asides of less than twenty percent. Porter, supra note
6, at 222-25.
292. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Justice Kennedy noted that the "finding of no value must be considered under the Takings Clause by
reference to the owner's reasonable, investment-backed expectations," and the finding of total
economic loss results in a compensable taking. Id See also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S.
164, 175 (1979); W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935).
293. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
294. See generally HousingPolicy.org, Incentives and Cost Offsets, http://www.housingpolicy.
org/toolbox/strategy/policies/inclusionaryzoning.html?tierid=121 (last visited Nov. 19, 2009); see
also PolicyLink, Inclusionary Zoning, http://policylink.info/EDTKIIZ/How.html (last visited Nov.
19, 2009) ("Effective inclusionary zoning programs usually offer developers a range of cost offsets
to achieve a double bottom line: affordable housing for residents and a reasonable, overall return for
developers.").
295. See Kautz, supra note 61, at 980 ("About thirty-five percent of the ordinances provide no
incentives whatsoever to a developer providing inclusionary housing."); ALEX F. SCHWARTZ,
HousING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 196 (2006); Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Napa, 108
Cal. Rptr. 2d 60, 60 (Ct. App. 2001). The City of Napa did allow for alternatives to satisfy the
inclusionary requirement, but no incentives or benefits to offset development costs of the affordable
units. Id.
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such programs, developers bear the costs of providing affordable housing to
low- and middle-income homebuyers.296 Does this scenario amount to an
unconstitutional taking?
Based on the takings criteria laid out in Lucas, a taking constitutes a
regulation that completely deprives an owner of all economically beneficial
use of his property.2 9 7 Thus, an ordinance is a taking if it deprives an owner
of all economically beneficial use of his property, and such a taking is found
unconstitutional without adequate compensation.298 Furthermore, under
Penn Central, a regulation that interferes with property may be of such a
magnitude that "there must be an exercise of eminent domain and
compensation to sustain [it]." 299 Both of these standards are appropriate to
analyze no benefit programs.
How does building an affordable housing unit in a market-rate
development affect the developer's bottom-line on those allocated lots?
Developers perform due diligence and cost estimations with the expectation
of about a twenty percent return on their investment .300  The market
regulates what developers can charge homebuyers for their product.30'
Developers must build at a certain specification to obtain their desired
return, and they must price their product at the highest amount possible in
order to achieve that profit margin.302 When units are sold under price
control regulations, the developers cannot realize their pre-determined
profits. Affordable housing units are obviously sold well below market
price, but what is more significant is that they are sold below building
cost.303  Economic studies have shown that "[t]he amount of revenue a
developer can gain by selling or renting a unit required to be affordable by a
mandatory [inclusionary zoning] policy is generally lower than the costs of
developing that unit. . . ." Some programs, especially in California,
296. California Association of Realtors, Inclusionary Zoning Issues Briefing Paper, in THE
CALIFORNIA INCLUSIONARY HOUSING READER 41, 43 (2003), available at
http://www.cacities.org/resourcefiles/20276.Califomia%2Inclusionary/2OHousing%2OReader.pdf
297. See supra note 240.
298. See supra note 240.
299. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978) (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)).
300. See Jennifer Langston, Developers Challenge Affordable Housing Study: City
Underestimates Costs, They Say, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 26, 2006, at B l, available at
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/257091_downtown26.html.
301. See generally Paul Emrath, The Economics of Inclusionary Zoning,
HOUSINGECONOMIcS.cOM, Feb. 2006, http://www.nahb.org/generic.aspx?sectionlD=
734&genericContentlD=52787&channellD=311.
302. Building specifications refer to the elaborateness of the building design and the quality of
materials used in the construction of the house. For an extensive compilation of building materials,
see generally RS MEANS BUILDING CONSTRUCTION COST DATA 2009 (67th ed. 2008).
303. See infra note 304 and accompanying text.
304. CENTER FOR HOUSING POLICY & FURMAN CENTER FOR REAL ESTATE & URBAN POLICY AT
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require builders to build affordable units with the exact same specifications
as market price units, thereby making the requirement of selling at an
affordable rate in these jurisdictions more impactful, or, in some situations, a
complete economic loss. 305
As stated earlier, under the Lucas test, a taking occurs when a
"[r]egulation. . . den[ies] the property owner all 'economically viable use of
his land."', 06  In a single-family residence scenario, a city ordinance
requiring a lot to be sold at a loss as a prerequisite for a building permit is a
regulation that deprives an owner of all economically beneficial use of the
property.o7 In a multifamily residence scenario, a city ordinance requiring a
unit to be sold at a loss as a prerequisite for a building permit is a regulation
that deprives an owner of all economically beneficial use of the property.30 s
Therefore, these ordinances are takings per Lucas.
Some mandatory inclusionary zoning proponents might argue that in a
multifamily scenario, developers are in fact selling "air space,"3 09 and
therefore the Penn Central standard bars a depravation-of-economic-value
taking analysis on the airspace. 310 However, unlike the train station in Penn
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, THE EFFECTS OF INCLUSIONARY ZONING ON LOCAL HOUSING MARKETS:
LESSONS FROM THE SAN FRANCISCO, WASHINGTON DC AND SUBURBAN BOSTON AREAS 8 (2008),
available at http://furmancenter.org/files/IZPolicyBrief LowRes.pdf.
305. See Emrath, supra note 301.
306. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1004 (1992); see supra note 239.
307. This scenario is best illustrated by the inclusionary zoning plan in Marin, California. In this
California community, developers "would have to sell or lease 50-60 percent at below-market rates,
which must be made affordable to households earning 60-80 percent of the median income-
resulting in a sale price of approximately S180,000-$240,000." News Release, Indep. Inst., New
Study Shows "Inclusionary Zoning" Hinders Development and Makes Housing Less Affordable
(Nov. 12, 2007), available at http://www.independent.org/newsroom/news-detail.asp?newslD=94.
At the time of this report, "the conservative median sale price of $838,750 (and homes in Marin
typically sell for much more), [thus] revenue from a ten-unit project, with 50 percent price-
controlled at 60 percent of the median household income, the revenue loss would total $3,293,740-
roughly 40% of the value of the project." Id
308. Unlike a single family home, a multifamily unit in a multistory building "possess[es] airspace
within the confounds of the building, with property owners enjoying a property right in the
airspace." Atascadero, Cal., Interim Urgency Ordinance Establishing a Moratorium on the Approval
of "Site Condominiums" (Sept. 26, 2006), available at http://www.atascadero.org/media/council/
el83al7092606-CondoMoratorium.doc. Thus, for multifamily developers, the airspace above their
lot is a resource that can be negatively affected by an inclusionary zoning ordinance.
309. Jeffrey A. Goldberg, Carefree Condominium Living and the "Illusion" of Home Ownership,
CONDOLAWYERS.COM, http://condolawyers.com/articles/carefree.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2009)
(noting that condominium (multifamily) buyers have actually purchased some airspace, and "[t]he
'real estate' that [they] 'own' is, technically, the air located between the floors, ceilings, and
perimeter walls").
310. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-33 (1978) (holding that the
petitioner could not separate the airspace above the train terminal and apply a complete-depravation-
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Central, a multifamily unit is not being separated from the units below in an
inclusionary zoning action. The defendants in Penn Central tried to separate
the airspace above the station in order to prove that the area in question, the
airspace, has lost all economic value.31 ' This is not the case here. As each
unit is well within the definition of parcel under the SCPEA, the Lucas
takings analysis and the Penn Central economic-impact analysis applies to
the unit alone, regardless of whether it is located on the ground or
312
airspace.
Because the ordinance results in a taking, the developer must be
adequately compensated. In a no benefit program, the municipality does not
satisfy the constitutional requirement of reimbursing a landowner for taking
his or her property. Proponents claim that the market-rate inventory
subsidizes the loss of profit and cost of the affordable housing units. 313
Furthermore, inclusionary zoning advocates state that houses in large tracts
end up subsidizing the losses on other houses due to market fluctuations.314
Both of these statements are true; however, these arguments are not
addressing the constitutional issues. One property subsidizing the losses of
another property does not remedy the loss of property use and value
resulting from governmental action.1 If the affordable unit was permitted
to be sold at market value, the developer would have received full market-
value-profit for the unit.1 If a "no incentives" policy does not pass
constitutional muster, are programs that do have incentives constitutionally
permissible?
5. "Density Bonus" and "Developer Benefits" Programs Cannot
Guarantee Just Compensation
As previously explained, ordinances that require set-asides of affordable
units amount to a taking.1 Therefore, to offset losses, cities and counties
must compensate developers for their compliance in some form or
of-economic-value standard to just the airspace).
311. Id. at 130-31.
312. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
313. See Emrath, supra note 301.
314. Id.
315. See supra notes 295-307 and accompanying text.
316. For example, if a commercial landowner has five lots, and one of the five is taken by the city
for a public purpose and without compensation, the fact that the other four lots, when developed with
shopping malls and office buildings, more than compensate for the fifth property's losses, does not
eliminate the fact that the fifth lot was taken without restitution. This justification adheres to the first
method's analysis which does not reflect the reality of how land is purchased, entitled, improved,
and sold.
317. See supra notes 295-307 and accompanying text.
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another.1 Municipalities offer several types of incentives in the form of
"expedited processing, fee deferrals, loans or grants, and density bonuses
that allow more intensive development. . . ."319 Density bonuses are the
most widely advocated incentive for developers.320
Proponents of mandatory programs highlight the potential benefits of
density bonus inclusions in affordable housing policy and suggest that this is
the only offset necessary for developers.32 1 Surprisingly, Robert C.
Ellickson, one of the most outspoken critics of inclusionary zoning, hints at
possible acceptance of programs with density bonuses.322 Although
Ellickson's concession is hailed by inclusionary zoning enthusiasts, his
embrace of density bonuses occurred in the early 1980s, well before modem
comments and studies undermined this inclusionary zoning cornerstone.323
Once praised as the stalwart foothold against mandatory inclusionary
zoning opposition, density bonus programs are now facing heavy
resistance.324 In many situations, additional density is either not possible or
not cost feasible to offset the loss of profits of affordable units. The
shortcomings of density bonuses are most prevalent in multifamily
318. The holding in Agins requires the government to compensate when there is a taking. See
supra note 240.
319. Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60, 64 (Ct. App. 2001).
320. Some of the incentives used by cities are increases in building heights, parking space
reductions, expedited permitting, and tax abatements. See Porter, supra note 6, at 222-25.
When granted by municipalities to allow developers to build more units on a given site
than local zoning laws would normally allow, density bonuses can be useful tools. In
theory this lowers the cost per unit so the developer can make some portion of the units
affordable for lower-income residents.
Doug Bibby, Dispelling the Myths of Density Bonuses, NAT'L REAL ESTATE INVESTOR, Apr. 1,
2008, at 108, available at http://nreionline.com/commentary/nmhc/real-estate-dispelling
myths density_041 1/.
321. See Lerman, supra note 116, at 389-90; see also Porter, supra note 6, at 222-23 (indicating
that Fairfax County, Virginia, the birthplace of inclusionary zoning, has a density bonus as its only
available incentive/off-set).
322. See Ellickson, supra note 25, at 1180-81. In 1981, Ellickson was convinced that a density
bonus could reduce the financial burden of inclusionary zoning, the extent of which was dependent
upon the following:
(1) the ratio of bonus units to inclusionary units; (2) the developer's savings in cost-of-
land-improvements per lot resulting from the additional density; (3) the reductions in
consumer valuations of project units resulting from both the increased project density and
the presence of inclusionary units; (4) scale efficiencies (or inefficiencies) resulting from
the construction of more dwelling units; and (5) whether the developer is permitted to
downgrade the designs, floor areas, and lot areas of inclusionary units.
Id.
323. See generally POWELL & STRINGHAM, supra note 10; MEANS ET AL., supra note 22.
324. See POWELL & STRINGHAM, supra note 10; see also MEANS ET AL., supra note 22; Emrath,
supra note 301.
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developments.325 Adding an additional floor to a building not only increases
the construction time of the development, but also tacks on a tremendous
amount of overall cost.3 26  For single-family residences, density bonuses
require more land on which to place the additional units.327 In many
situations, developers have exhausted the land to its utmost "economically
feasible density, which makes a density bonus worthless."328 Furthermore,
as time passes, density bonuses become less effective because they are not
325. A multifamily development includes "apartment buildings, townhouses, condominiums, and
shared housing." Pepper Tree Homes, Multi-Family, http://www.peppertreehomes.com/multi-
family/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2009). "These buildings may be communities, or merely a collection
of separate entities. "[M]ulti family dwellings are an affordable and potentially fun alternative to the
single family home." Id.
326. Benjamin Powell & Edward Stringham, "The Economics of Inclusionary Zoning
Reclaimed": How Effective Are Price Controls?, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 471, 486 (2005). When a
designer increases the overall height of a building several factors are included. Id. The most
obvious factor is the increased weight of the building, which requires higher gauge steel beams or
larger wooden beams in the lower floors to support the additional weight. Id. A thicker foundation
and larger footings are also required to hold and displace the load of the extra construction. Id.
Consequently, an increase of mass in the building's key structural components increases the cost per
structural feature. Id. (noting that "worthless density bonuses occur with high-rises where building
any higher would be too costly"). For example, going from a standard 18 gauge by 4" wide, 16" on-
center steel beam to a more weight supporting 16 gauge by 4" wide, 16" on-center steel beam
increases your cost by $2.05 per linear foot. RS MEANS BUILDING CONSTRUCTION COST DATA
2009, METALS, STRUCTURAL STEEL METAL STUD FRAMING, LOAD BEARING STUD FRAMING (67th
ed. 2008). That means that every eight-foot stud used in the building will cost an extra $16.40.
Also, more tenants over the same size footprint increases the number of amenities and amount of
infrastructure required. This is well illustrated by Doug Bibby, President of the National Multi
Housing Council in Washington, D.C.:
[A]dding more units often requires owners to add more parking, and in mid-rise and
high-rise construction, parking is a significant cost. Adding two parking spaces to a high-
rise building for a density bonus unit could add another $40,000 to $60,000 to costs. In
other words, sometimes a building simply cannot accommodate 10 additional units or 10
more parking spaces, either because of the costs or because of the site.
Bibby, supra note 320.
327. Single family residences are built on their own lot, thus, the one-lot-per-home scheme
requires more land to include density. However, municipalities regulate curb, side lot, and back yard
set-backs. The smaller the set back requirement, the smaller the lot; therefore, density can also be
increased by decreasing the sizes of the lots.
328. Powell & Stringham, supra note 326, at 485-86. In the late twentieth century, infill
developments became major contributors to new housing in older, well-established communities like
Denver, Colorado and Atlanta, Georgia. NORTHEAST-MIDWEST INSTITUTE & CONGRESS FOR THE
NEW URBANISM, STRATEGIES FOR SUCCESSFUL INFILL DEVELOPMENT 40 (2001) ("'As more
Atlantans become fed up with traffic snarls, they are demanding new housing that is close to work,'
John Glover of Post Properties told the Atlanta Business Chronicle . . .. Added the Chronicle, 'One
of the key strategies for Post and many other Atlanta home builders is their adoption of "infill"
programs."'). Infill projects are developments that are built in small pockets of existing cities and
communities, on sites that are either empty or blighted. As a result, these sites are restricted to the
area they are allotted and adding additional units on a confined plot is not possible. Furthermore, the
density of single-family units is restricted by the lot size. See Powell & Stringham, supra note 326,
at 486. Home buyers and city codes restrict the size of the lot to a minimum square footage, making
density bonuses in certain situations absolutely worthless. Id
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adjusted for increased construction and land costs. 329  For instance,
subsequent ordinances and increased land values over time increase the per-
unit cost of development, and a density bonus might not be adequate to
offset the rising costs. 330  Moreover, land sellers are aware of density
bonuses and undercut the supposed benefits of density bonuses by adding in
the increase livable-unit/acre ratio to land purchase prices.331  Thus, "the
density bonus that was meant to help offset high land costs and provide
incentives to incorporate lower-rent units" loses its value. 2
It is important to understand that density bonuses allotted in
inclusionary zoning programs are purposed for just compensation, whether
effective or not.3  They are offered to allow a builder to regain lost profits
on a development caused by the requirement of affordable housing. They
are not used to "shift development away from one location (the 'sending
area') toward another location (the 'receiving area')" like a standard
transferable development right.334
329. See Bibby, supra note 320 ("Ultimately, the biggest problem with density bonuses is that the
longer they are used in a jurisdiction, the less effective they become. [This is because] they typically
do not keep up with land and construction costs.").
330. Once more, Doug Bibby appropriately illustrates an explanatory scenario:
Say a jurisdiction calculates when it creates its density bonus program in 1995 that a
10% bonus is sufficient to offset the cost of the affordable housing units.
By 2005 though, developers and owners are facing increases in taxes, insurance,
utilities and other operating expenses that exceed the value of the density bonus, which
typically remain static. Is the cost per unit today and the value of the density offset
reflected in the density bonus of a decade ago?
See Bibby, supra note 320.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. See PORTER, supra note 6 at 227 (noting that the most common "compensatory offering is
density bonuses"); supra notes 324-332 and accompanying text. If this off-set technique truly
compensated for lost profits, developers would unhesitatingly comply; however, such is not the case.
Powell & Stringham, supra note 326, at 486 ("If a program was voluntary and builders chose to
provide below-market units in exchange for a density bonus, it would demonstrate that the benefits
more than offset the costs. Yet when looking at most real-world ordinances, the builders do not
flock to participate.").
334. THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF ENvT'L AFFAIRS & THE DEP'T OF Hous. AND CMTY. DEV.,
EXCERPTS FROM A STUDY OF THE FEASIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT
RIGHTS UNDER THE RIVERS PROTECTION ACT 1 (2002), available at http://commpres.env.state
.ma.us/publications/TDRReportExcerpts.pdf. Most transferable development rights (TDR) are
structured around the following factors:
[1.] TDR is often (but not always) development-neutral in that it changes the pattern but
not the total amount or type of development. The amount of development is neither
increased nor decreased, but rather shifted from one location to another.
[2.] TDR is generally structured to encourage or require an increase in the allowable
density of development in the receiving area while reducing the density of development
in the sending area. The overall result is a concentration of development in the receiving
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Apart from economic issues of density bonuses, there are several social
critiques. Higher density planning is constantly under fire from neighboring
residences, and density bonus incentives contribute to this unpopular market
and the public outcry.' Developments that are required to include
affordable housing and consequently accept the higher density are routinely
fought by Not in My Backyard ("NIMBY") neighbors who challenge them
during the approval phase.3 As a result, these developments are severely
delayed,337 effectively costing the complying developer more money."
areas, reducing development-induced fragmentation of open space and leaving more total
land area in undeveloped uses (sending areas).
[3.] TDR provides equity for differently situated property owners by preserving the
opportunity for economic gain for property owners in sending areas while increasing
value in receiving areas. Thus, the burden of development regulations in different areas
is distributed more evenly.
[4.] TDR is usually undertaken to avoid common development impacts or to accomplish
an environmental goal, including protection of water quality, preservation of open space,
and more efficient use of infrastructure.
[5.] TDR engages the private market in generating transactions and determining the price
of development rights. While most TDR programs have some form of locally or
regionally administered trading, they are designed to reflect market trends and facilitate
private transactions.
Id. In inclusionary zoning, the bonuses are to merely offset losses and not to operate under the five
TDR standards listed above. See also Douglas Fruehling, TDR 101, WASH. BUS. J., Aug. 17, 2007,
http://www.bizjoumals.com/washington/stories/2007/08/20/focus9.html.
335. See EDWARD A. TOMBARI, MIXED USE DEVELOPMENT 4-5 (2005), available at
http://www.co.cal.md.us/assets/Planning Zoning/TownCenters/MixedDevelopmentArticle.pdf.
Trends in the real estate market indicate that homebuyers consistently show strong negative
reactions to higher densities and have accepted its use only grudgingly. Id These negative reactions
are founded on the view that higher density equates to high traffic and high crime rates, irrespective
of social demographics. Id.
336. See Tombari, supra note 335, at 12. There is a high potential for developers to be bombarded
by protests from "residents to mixed-use, most commonly a negative reaction to 'higher density' or
land uses not appropriate for residential areas." Id. The increased density of boarding properties is
perceived by neighbors as "a nuisance, degradation of quality of life and loss of property value." Id
There are many recorded cases of density bonus developments being hindered by protesting
neighbors. Id Case in point, in March of 2008, a woman sued the City of Los Angeles over a new
ordinance allowing builders to construct taller, bulkier buildings if they include affordable units.
Kerry Cavanaugh, Density Bonus Is Targeted by Lawsuit, DAILY NEWS OF L.A., April 9, 2008, at
A3. In support of the woman's complaint, Planning Commission President Jane Ellison Usher
criticized the density bonus ordinance, objecting that it would allow "large, bulky developments with
fewer parking spaces on residential sites that have no transit or jobs nearby," and offered a legal
strategy to challenge it. Id. Business owners and homeowners in the area joined the suit and urged
the Planning Department of Los Angeles to rewrite the law. Id A lawsuit such as this will
inevitably hold up any proposed development within the ordinances jurisdiction and cost the
developer money. See infra note 337.
337. The perception of those within the building and development industry is that "incentives are
increasingly difficult to achieve within the context of NIMBY [(Not in My Backyard)] resistance to
affordable housing and density bonuses and in light of a development approval process that is
increasingly driven by multiple public hearings and intense citizen input." NAT'L Ass'N OF HOME
BUILDERS, Inclusionary Zoning: A Close Look Reveals that Inclusionary Zoning Is Not an Effective
Way to Promote Housing Affordability, in THE MYTHS AND FACTS ABOUT INCLUSIONARY ZONING
16 (2007), available at http://www.nahb.org/fileUpload-details.aspx?contentlD=69634. Thus, the
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Municipalities do, however, offer more than just density bonuses to
offset the costs of set-asides. 339 Although density bonuses are much more
prevalent, a few jurisdictions offer certain fee waivers, expedited permit
processing, and tax abatements.340 The most compelling are the tax and fee
waiver incentives which are, more or less, government subsidies.
Effectively, a local subsidy that is procured to offset the losses of
inclusionary zoning results in the local city or county paying for the
affordable units. One purported benefit of mandatory inclusionary zoning is
that this technique does not cost the local government a dime, 34' but if the
government is going to pay for the affordable units, why would it support a
technique that limits the supply of housing? 342 Furthermore, if government
subsidies were in the least bit effective in covering the builder's losses on
the affordable units, developers would surely flock to participate in such a
win-win program.343 This, however, is not the case.3" Therefore,
"incentives theoretically make it possible to recoup costs. But in the end, the potential benefits
associated with such incentives are lost in the negotiations for permit approvals." Id.
338. Most real estate developers do not operate on profit dollars, but on Return of Investment
(ROI). See Resource Management Systems, Inc., FAQs: IT Budgeting, http://www.rms.net/lc_
faqother roi.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2009) (ROI is "[a] measure of the net income a firm is able
to earn with . .. its total assets. Return on investment is calculated by dividing net profits after taxes
by total assets."). To determine a company's ROI, subtract the cost of investment from the gain of
the investment, and divide that by the cost of the investment. In real estate development, the cost of
investment is comprised of all the costs included in making the housing unit (land costs, land
grading costs, architectural fees, infrastructure construction costs, building costs, fees, etc.). The
gain from the investment, in this industry, is the net income from the sale of a housing unit. There
is, however, a time factor in real estate ROI. Because real estate cannot produce any income until it
is sold, standing inventory and standing production costs drain the treasury of developers as time
passes; therefore, the sooner a house or condo is sold the higher the ROI because the gain on the
houses or condo can go back into producing more housing units, thereby indirectly increasing the
overall gain on the initial investment. In a scenario where a project is held up by protesting
neighbors, time is lapsing, and the costs that have gone into the initial start up of the development
are becoming more expensive.
339. For a list of other incentives, see Porter, supra note 6, at 222-25.
340. Porter, supra note 6, at 222-25.
341. See Kautz, supra note 61, at 983 (explaining that "from a local agency standpoint,
inclusionary zoning provides affordable housing at no public cost"); see also Lerman, supra note
116, at 392 ("Another important benefit of mandatory inclusionary programs is that they provide
affordable housing for the community without a large public financial investment.").
342. See Powell & Stringham, supra note 326, at 487 ("If the government has the ability to offer
subsidies or zoning exemptions that will increase the supply, then why must those policies be
accompanied with a program that restricts the supply?"). Powell and Stringham further state that
even if government subsidies covered the developers' costs, and the inclusionary zoning ordinances
were voluntary, the technique would still negatively affect housing affordability. Id. They conclude
that the financial burden on the developers reduces the overall output of housing and tax subsidies
would have no positive effect on the total output. Id.
343. See Powell & Stringham, supra note 326, at 486.
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The real test of whether density bonuses (or other incentives) make up for the costs of
the program is if builders would voluntarily choose them. If a program was voluntary
and builders chose to provide below-market units in exchange for a density bonus, it
would demonstrate that the benefits more than offset the costs. Yet when looking at most
real-world ordinances, the builders do not flock to participate.
Id. at 486.
344. Many proponents of mandatory programs argue that affordable housing ordinances are
profitable and actually benefit the builders, but builders and developers fail to understand and
recognize this. See Kautz supra note 61, at 982 ("Even where a 'relatively generous' density bonus
is given for voluntary participation, developers often fail to participate because they do not
understand the economics of the program .... ); see also Dietderich, supra note 22, at 76 (noting
that although there are some potential short term losses, inclusionary zoning is offset by long term
gains, and mandatory programs are in the interest of the developer). Recently, studies and scholars,
such as Powell and Stringham, have come down on these claims as specious and unsupported:
Kautz may know something that everyone else does not, but she gives us no reason to
believe why a lawyer writing in a law review article has a better understanding of the
profitability of projects than actual builders who make their living doing those
calculations. Even if Kautz were correct that developers are incapable of calculating the
profitability of projects, as long as one or two builders stumbled into Kautz's gold mine,
they would start making above-normal profits, which would encourage others to follow.
The assertion that these affordable housing mandates are really profitable but builders do
not understand the economics behind them is extremely dubious.
Powell & Stringham, supra note 326, at 486-87. Powell and Stringham continue their criticism by
dismantling Andrew Dietderich's claim "that inclusionary zoning actually benefits builders and,
thus, will not hamper supply." Id at 488. They tackle his first claim that builders do not participate
in voluntary inclusionary zoning ordinances because of a potential loss of good will; however, if a
mandatory ordinance was put in place, the "builders would benefit because they would get the
density bonus without losing goodwill. Id; see also Dietderich, supra note 22, at 76. Powell and
Stringham argue that:
First, if a city's residents and representatives favored affordable housing enough to pass
an ordinance to encourage its production, why builders would lose goodwill for
producing affordable housing is unclear. Second, at a more fundamental level, the
erroneousness of this argument is demonstrated by the fact that most builders oppose
inclusionary zoning. If mandatory inclusionary zoning actually benefited builders, why
would they lack the foresight to support it? Economists have documented many
industries where industry participants have lobbied for government regulation in order to
secure gains.
Id. at 488-89 (footnote omitted). Dietderich's second explanation why builders do not embrace
inclusionary zoning is due to the to the fact that multifamily developments have a spillover effect,
meaning that subsequent builders will be able to take advantage of the designs and logistics findings
of their predecessors and make high profits off of the efforts of the other builders. See Dietderich,
supra note 22, at 76. Therefore, there are no pioneers waiting in the wings to spend the capital
necessary to get the ball rolling; thus, the multifamily projects remain shelved. To end this
quagmire, Dietderich suggests "that if all builders were forced to build high-density multifamily
dwellings, they would collectively make higher profits, so the issue is just pushing them to this
Pareto superior equilibrium." Powell & Stringham, supra note 326, at 489. By mandating that all
builders comply with the same multifamily standard, no single builder will be forced to single-
handedly bear the burden of preconstruction research and start-up costs. In response, Powell and
Stringham argue:
Dietderich wants the reader to assume that the building industry does not know what is
profitable. Yet he gives no reason to believe that builders lack an understanding of the
concepts of learning curves or technological spillovers. If mandatory inclusionary zoning
really helped builders secure higher profits, one would expect the building industry to
rally around Dietderich's proposal. Because builders do not, either builders do not
adequately understand their own industry or Dietderich's argument is incorrect. We
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mandatory programs are not only uninviting to developers, the fee waivers,
tax exemptions, and expedient permit processing benefits undermine the
advocates' claim that tax dollars are not allocated to the building of the
affordable units.
The attempt to compensate losses by offering these bonuses and
incentives, although well intentioned, has missed the mark because the
possible benefits "have proven difficult to achieve or insufficient to make up
the costs." 345  Some municipalities have recognized the faults of density
bonuses and incentives, and offer alternatives to strict compliance with the
mandatory inclusionary zoning requirements. However, substantial analysis
of the most popular and widely used "alternatives" to providing in-
development affordable housing reveals that these too fail to make the grade.
C. Programs with "Alternatives" Operate in Strict Contradiction to the
Goals ofInclusionary Zoning
There are several municipalities that employ mandatory inclusionary
programs that allow developers to substitute set-asides with an alternative.
For example, the City of Napa allowed for an "alternative equivalent
proposal" such as a dedication of land, in-lieu payments or fees, or the
construction of affordable units on another site.346 These three alternatives
appear in dozens of other municipality programs and seem to be among the
most popular.3 47  This technique (of allowing alternative equivalent
proposals) is used as a way to buttress a mandatory exclusionary program by
allowing the municipality to approach developers with other ways to
contribute to its affordable housing program in the event that set-asides are
not possible.348  Also, municipalities use alternatives as a way to show
protesting parties and courts that the program is flexible and
accommodating.349 In return, developers receive benefits, which, as argued
strongly suspect the latter.
Powell & Stringham, supra note 326, at 489.
345. NAT'L Ass'N OF HOME BUILDERS, supra note 337, at 5.
346. See Home Builders Ass'n v. City ofNapa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60, 62 (Ct. App. 2001).
347. See Porter, supra note 6, at 222-25. Of the eleven municipalities that Porter describes that
offer alternatives, all eleven employed dedication of land alternatives, in-lieu fee alternatives, or the
off-site construction alternatives, or a combination of the three. Id.
348. See Lerman, supra note 116, at 390 ("Alternatives address developments where affordable
units cannot be provided cost effectively."); see also Porter, supra note 6, at 229-30.
349. Sacramento, California; Sarasota, Florida; Bainbridge Island, Washington; and many other
municipalities tout the flexibility of their inclusionary zoning plans by highlighting their
accommodating incentives. Mun. Researchers & Serv. Ctr. of Wash., Affordable Housing
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earlier, are not a guarantee of full compensation. Although these alternative
programs are popular with inclusionary zoning proponents, they operate in a
contradictory manner to the socioeconomic goals of inclusionary zoning.350
For the purposes of this comment, the most popular alternatives-in-lieu
fees, land dedications, and offsite construction-will be analyzed.35'
1. In-lieu Fees: The Counterproductive Alternative
In-lieu fees are a common alternative that allow a developer to decline
to include below-market units with market value units by paying fees to the
municipality. 352 These fees are then placed in a city-held general housing
Ordinances/Flexible Provisions, http://www.mrsc.org/Subjects/Housing/ords.aspx (last visited Nov.
20, 2009).
350. See Laura M. Padilla, Reflections on Inclusionary Housing and a Renewed Look at Its
Viability, 23 HOFSTRA L. REv. 539, 564-67 (1995) ("[I]nclusionary housing could accomplish
economic, as well as racial, integration."); Linda J. Bozung, Inclusionary Housing: Experience
Under a Model Program, 6 ZONING & PLANNING L. REP. 89, 91 (1983) ("Concentration of
[affordable] units is considered undesirable because experience with large-scale, low-income
housing projects indicates that they tend to deteriorate both physically and socially, and frequently
become unsafe for residents as well as the surrounding neighborhood. It is believed that scattering
affordable units throughout conventional projects may avoid these problems by encouraging better
tenant maintenance, increased community acceptance, and higher quality construction."); Lisa C.
Young, Breaking the Color Line: Zoning and Opportunity in America's Metropolitan Areas, 8 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 667, 685 (2005) ("Despite zoning's sordid history of racial segregation,
exclusion, and expulsion, in some metropolitan areas, [inclusionary] zoning can actually promote the
creation of affordable housing and help break the color line in housing."). The goals and principles
of inclusionary are many, including:
1. Better access to expanding suburban job opportunities for workers in low- and
moderate-income households-especially the unemployed
2. Greater opportunities for such households to upgrade themselves by moving into
middle-income neighborhoods, thereby escaping from crisis ghetto conditions
3. Higher quality public schooling for children from low-income households who could
attend schools dominated by children from middle-income households
4. Greater opportunity for the nation to reach its officially adopted goals for producing
improved housing for low- and moderate-income households
5. Fairer geographic distribution of the fiscal and social costs of dealing with
metropolitan-area poverty
6. Less possibility of major conflicts in the future caused by confrontations between two
spatially separate and unequal societies in metropolitan areas
7. Greater possibilities of improving adverse conditions in crisis ghetto areas without
displacing urban decay to adjacent neighborhoods
ANTHONY DowNs, OPENING UP THE SUBURBS: AN URBAN STRATEGY FOR AMERICA 26 (1973).
351. See supra note 347 and accompanying text.
352. In California, eighty percent of the municipalities that have inclusionary zoning ordinances
have in-lieu fees as an alternative to set-asides. See John J. Delaney, Addressing the Affordable
Housing Crisis-The Problem: Exclusionary Zoning; The Unfairest Solution: "Inclusionary"
Zoning, SNO05 ALl-ABA 1553, 1566 (2007). Sometimes, fees are only allowed under certain
circumstances where the project is under a certain unit count or an affordable housing requirement
calculation results in a fraction. See Colo. State Dep't of Local Affairs-Div. of Hous., Summary of
Inclusionary Zoning Practices in Colorado Communities, http://dola.colorado.gov/cdh/researchers/
documents/izo summary.htn (last visited Nov. 20, 2009) ("[Under] Glenwood Springs Inclusionary
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trust fund to be used for affordable housing initiatives." The assets kept in
the trust funds are used for a variety of purposes such as increasing the
affordable housing supply in areas that are in need,354 acquiring land for
affordable housing units, and constructing housing units for ownership or
rental, including transitional housing.355 Although the funds are sometimes
used for "inclusionary-like" purposes,56 housing trust funds are allocated at
the discretion of city officials for whatever affordable housing purpose they
deem necessary.5 Unfortunately, in many cases the allocated funds are
used for purposes that are in direct contradiction to the purpose of
Zoning ... [a] cash-in-lieu fee can be collected only if the development is small and results in a
fraction."). For example, if a city requires a builder to set aside fifteen percent of its units for
affordable housing, and the development has twenty-five condominium units, the developer must set
aside 3.75 units. In this scenario, the builder would set aside three units and then pay in-lieu fees on
the three-quarters of a unit. Therefore, if each affordable condominium is valued at $100,000, the
builder will pay $75,000 into the city housing trust fund.
353. Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60, 62 (Ct. App. 2001); see also
HousingPolicy.org, Glossary, In-lieu Fee, http://www.housingpolicy.org/glossary.html#l (last visited
Nov. 20, 2009). A housing trust fund is "a restricted account within the [municipality's] general
fund and must be used exclusively to assist with affordable and special needs housing in the
[municipality]." Salt Lake City, Housing Trust Fund, http://www.ci.slc.ut.us/Ced/hand/new/pages/
htfb2-1.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2009). These funds are constantly watched and are not used
without going through a highly regulated process (i.e., a quorum vote from the city council). Id
354. City of Sacramento, Cal. Planning Dep't, Housing Trust Fund Ordinance,
http://www.cityofsacramento.org/planning/projects/housing-trust-fund/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2009)
("Because low-wage workers are often unable to afford housing close to their work sites, the fee-
generated revenue is used to increase the supply of housing affordable to these income groups,
creating the nexus or linkage between jobs and housing.").
355. See Salt Lake City, supra note 353. The Salt Lake City government website states that the
funds are for:
1. Acquisition, leasing, rehabilitation, or new construction of housing units for ownership
or rental, including transitional housing;
2. Emergency home repairs;
3. Retrofitting to provide access for persons with disabilities;
4. Down payment and closing cost assistance;
5. Construction and gap financing;
6. Land acquisition for affordable and special needs housing units;
7. Technical assistance; [and]
8. Other activities and expenses incurred that directly assist in providing affordable and
special needs housing.
Id.
356. See CITY OF BERKELEY Hous. DEP'T, HOUSING TRUST FUND GUIDELINES (2002)
[hereinafter BERKELEY GUIDELINES], available at http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/uploadedFiles
/Housing/Level_3-General/HousingTrust Fund Guidelines.pdf. Funds are used to assist
individuals who live in mixed-income developments, with rent. Id
357. See Salt Lake City, supra note 353 ("No expenditures may be made from the fund without
the approval of the City Council. Funds may not be used for administrative expenses.").
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inclusionary zoning.358 Other municipalities give housing trust funds to
community action agencies and community housing organizations as well as
transitional housing programs for special needs individuals. 59  These
programs, and social programs like them, are commendable and illustrate the
concern these municipalities have for low-income and special needs
individuals; however, the use of inclusionary zoning in-lieu funds strips the
affordable housing technique of its purpose.
First, programs that use in-lieu fees perpetuate the ghettoization of
affordable housing communities in direct conflict with the inclusionary
zoning purpose.360  Housing projects that consist of a high percentage of
affordable units tend not to be economically diverse, essentially centralizing
and concentrating poverty.361 Second, housing trust fund revenues are used
solely to build affordable housing developments and transitional housing
units.362 Building developments consisting solely of affordable housing
actively separates below-market tenants and homeowners from median and
high income developments and neighborhoods.36 3 Transitional housing
programs are, by definition, temporary half-way housing programs not
tailored specifically to low- and middle-income families who need mere
housing assistance, but tailored to a cornucopia of disadvantaged and special
needs persons with an array of social needs.3 6 Third, and most unfortunate,
358. Cal. Ass'n of Realtors, Inclusionary Zoning Issues Briefing Paper, in THE CALIFORNIA
INCLUSIONARY HOUSING READER 43 (Bill Higgins ed., 2003), available at
http://www.cacities.org/resource files/20276.California%20Inclusionary/o2OHousing%20Reader.pd
f (In lieu fee programs are not effective because "[m]any jurisdictions collect in-lieu fees, but do not
leverage the revenues to build more affordable housing. Instead, in some cases, the money is not
spent to produce new affordable housing."). One example is the allocation of funds from the
housing trust fund in the City of Berkeley. Under its guidelines, Berkeley allocates funds from its
housing trust to rental apartments which have sixty percent of its units below market and assist
households with incomes above eighty percent of median income, or who refuse to give income
information, in occupied rental units. See BERKELEY GUIDELINES, supra note 356, at 5.
Furthermore, developers can receive financing from the housing trust fund to build and manage a
project as long as it observes minimum building codes like complying with the "bars on windows
requirements." Id. at 8. Also, funds are used for special needs individuals. Id. at 14. "Special
needs" personnel are people who are homeless, disabled, the frail elderly, and people with
HIV/AIDS. Id.
359. See, e.g., DEP'T OF HOUS. & CMTY. DEV., MASSACHUSETTS AFFORDABLE HOUSING TRUST
FUND GUIDELINES (2006) [hereinafter MASSACHUSETTS GUIDELINES], available at
http://www.mass.gov/Ehed/docs/dhcd/hd/aht/ahtfguide.pdf; see also supra note 358.
360. The City of Berkeley plan gives funds to rentals that "include utilities based on the utilities
schedule used for the Federal Section 8 Program Tenant-based Rental Assistance Program."
BERKELEY GUIDELINES, supra note 356, at 3. One of the fundamental purposes behind inclusionary
zoning is to decentralize poverty. See supra note 350 and accompanying text.
361. See POWELL & STRINGHAM, supra note 10, at 8.
362. See MASSACHUSETTS GUIDELINES, supra note 359.
363. Just like supporting "Section 8"-like housing, this centralizes poverty in contradiction to
inclusionary policy. See supra note 350.
364. The City and County of San Francisco notes that its transitional housing accommodates the
homeless and assists them with intensive "education [courses], job training and placement, substance
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general housing trust funds have the capacity to funnel inclusionary housing
funds away from those in need.3 65  Thus, affordable housing funds are not
necessarily used for those in need of affordable housing.366 By comingling
inclusionary zoning funds with general housing funds, the in-lieu fees betray
their purpose and effectively reduce the amount of affordable housing in the
community, and thus are of little value to the inclusionary zoning objectives.
Fourth, municipalities that use in-lieu fees solely for the purpose of buying
land to build affordable housing units effectively undermine inclusionary
zoning goals by setting aside and segregating affordable housing from
market-rate developments in the same manner that land dedications and off-
site construction do.367 This alternative clearly does not fulfill the mission of
inclusionary zoning, a symptomatic failure also found in land dedications
and off-site construction.
2. Land Dedications and Off-Site Construction: Not in My Backyard!
Land dedications and off-site construction can be analyzed together
because they operate in unison and contradict the goals of inclusionary
zoning in the same way. Both alternatives are popular with the hundreds of
California municipalities that have enacted inclusionary zoning
ordinances.368
abuse counseling, parenting classes and childcare services." Human Serv. Agency of S.F.,
Transitional Housing, http://www.sfhsa.org/88.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2009).
365. Rent standards shall be set for the units and are not necessarily based on the tenant's
household income. This may result in households paying more than thirty percent of their incomes
for rent, or paying less than thirty percent. See BERKELEY GUIDELINES, supra note 356, at 3. As
previously mentioned, the City of Berkeley program assists individuals who do not even have to
divulge economic information to receive rent assistance and can possibly assist individuals who pay
less than thirty percent of their income towards housing, which would place them outside of HUD's
affordable housing criteria. HUD states that the individuals that need affordable housing are those
who spend more than 30 percent of their income on housing because "[flamilies who pay more than
30 percent of their income for housing are considered cost burdened and may have difficulty
affording necessities such as food, clothing, transportation and medical care." U.S. Dep't of Hous.
& Urban Dev., Affordable Housing, http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/affordablehousing/ (last visited
Nov. 20, 2009).
366. Inclusionary zoning's primary function is to create affordable housing for low- and medium-
income households. PolicyLink, Inclusionary Zoning-What Is It?, http://www.policylink.org/
EDTK/IZ/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2009).
367. See infra notes 369-377 and accompanying text.
368. Of the 369 municipalities included in the National Center for Smart Growth Research and
Education's study, fifty-seven percent included off-site allowances and twenty-five percent included
land dedications. KNAAP ET AL. supra note 59, at 8.
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Land grants and dedications allow developers to purchase land and then
contribute the land to the municipality's affordable housing plan rather than
incorporate below-market units into their developments.369 In practice, land
dedications have produced affordable housing; however, this technique
disrupts the purpose of inclusionary zoning. 370 By isolating the affordable
housing from the market-rate units, land dedications "undermine the
economic and social integration that many inclusionary policies aim to
create" by lumping together the lower-class and isolating them from the
other classes.37 1 No longer are inclusionary dollars used for an inclusionary
purpose, and this alternative to integration consolidates and centralizes
poverty in strict contradiction with a primary goal of inclusionary zoning.
Off-site construction allows builders to construct an affordable housing
complex in another location, away from their market-rate development,
rather than including below-market units. 72 Unlike land dedications, the
responsibility of producing affordable units remains with the developer, and
the local authorities are not involved in the actual production of housing.373
However, similar to the land dedications, off-site development isolates
affordable housing and restricts residential integration.374
369. Cal. Coal. for Rural Hous. & Non-Profit Hous. Ass'n of N. Cal., Inclusionary Housing in
California: 30 Years of Innovation, in INCLUSIONARY ZONING: THE CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCE 11
(2004) [hereinafter Inclusionary Housing in California], available at
http://www.calruralhousing.org/sites/default/files/Inclusionary30Years.pdf ("Developerts] can
substitute a gift of land that may accommodate an equivalent number of units in place of affordable
unit construction."). Developers basically pass the baton to the local authorities by dedicating the
land, placing the responsibly on the city or county to build the affordable units. Id. at 14. In this
scenario, "local governments must assume responsibility for this construction and often recruit
nonprofit developers to complete the task." Id. The typical procedure involves the private entity
deeding the land to the municipality, "which then deeds it to a community-based nonprofit on a
competitive basis, or is deeded directly by the developer to a nonprofit organization." Id.
370. Id. ("Edgewater Place in Larkspur in Marin County[, for example,] is a 50-unit development
built by the Ecumenical Association for Housing on land dedicated by an adjacent condo developer.
In this case, the land dedication allowed for double the number of units required under the policy by
combining the land with funding from other sources.").
371. Inclusionary Housing in California, supra note 369, at 21. Not bringing together the
suburban wealthy and the urban poor is one of the most pervasive criticisms of many of the
inclusionary zoning programs in use today. See Lerman, supra note 116, at 402-03. Lerman notes
that Massachusetts's Anti-Snob Act has produced housing that has been "swayed toward two
segments of the population, the elderly and current residents of the community, thus failing to
provide affordable housing for the larger population. Therefore, the Massachusetts program fails to
encourage diverse and integrated affordable housing." Id. (footnotes omitted).
372. Inclusionary Housing in Calfornia, supra note 369, at 11.
373. Id. at 14-15. For profit developers and non-profit builders sometimes team up. Id. at 15-16.
The non-profit builder funds its project with the assets of the other which results in a win-win for all
parties involved. Id. at 16.
374. As mentioned above, although the teamwork between profit and nonprofit builders appears to
be a win-win, the housing developments are built away from one another, isolating the affordable
units from the market-rate units. See Inclusionary Housing in California, supra note 369, at 16.
"Allowing off-site construction and design differences threaten some of the potential benefits of
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Land dedications and off-site construction options run contrary to the
fundamental elements of inclusionary zoning.375 A program is hardly
inclusionary if it allows for socioeconomic segregation funded by the very
dollars and resources allocated for an inclusionary purpose. Furthermore,
the success of these alternatives is dependent on the approval of surrounding
neighborhoods, which may harbor discriminatory opinions against high
density affordable housing. 376  Obstructing campaigns from surrounding
communities will inevitably delay and may even prohibit construction of the
units, rendering the alternatives useless.377
It is evident from the above analysis that mandatory inclusionary zoning
ordinances are not only exactions evoking heightened scrutiny, but are also
unconstitutional takings on other grounds and operate in contradiction to
their purpose.378 The major problem with these programs, as they operate
today, is that they do not encourage developers to participate.7 If a
program was designed in such a way as to encourage developers to
participate, not only would it escape the constitutional and compensatory
inclusionary programs, such as simultaneous development of market- and below market-rate units,
functional and aesthetic integration of affordable units into new neighborhoods, and minimization of
neighborhood opposition." Id. at 15.
375. See supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
376. Jay A. Riffkin, Comment, Responsible Development? The Need for Revision to Seattle's
Inclusionary Housing Plan, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 443, 450 (2009) ("Developing buildings that are
constructed entirely of low-income units often creates anxiety amongst community members who
fear that affordable housing will increase crime and stunt property values." (footnote omitted)).
Although the position is very controversial, several studies and investigations have found that "[iln
areas comprised mostly of low-income housing ... crime can be higher." Cal. Planning Roundtable,
Myths & Facts About Affordable and High Density Housing,
http://www.abag.ca.gov/services/finance/fan/housingmyths2.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2009); see
also Hanna Rosin, American Murder Mystery, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July/Aug. 2008, at 40,
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200807/memphis-crime (stating that low-income
housing is the culprit in the rise of crime); Mary Lynne Vellinga, Natomas Crime Wave Raises
Concerns About Affordable Housing, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 22, 2008, at 8A. Regardless of the
veracity of these discriminatory sentiments, local government will have to deal with such prejudices
because "ultimately, the success of [larger affordable housing developments] depends on . . . the
level of public acceptance by the surrounding community." Inclusionary Housing in Cahfornia,
supra note 369, at 15.
377. A wide range of neighborhoods across the country have had success with delaying or halting
construction of unwanted development. See Joshua Akers, New Wal-Mart Blocked, ALBUQUERQUE
J. Feb. 2, 2004, at 2, available at http://www.abqjoumal.com/biz/oullook/140156outlookO2-02-
04.htm (noting that a neighborhood group stopped the construction of a Wal-Mart); see also Mike
Tysarczyk, Wilkinsburg Residents Seek to "Drive Envirotest Out," PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE-REV.,
June 30, 1994, at I (highlighting the ability of a neighborhood coalition against a common cause
(i.e., a six-lane highway)).
378. See supra notes 110-377 and accompanying text.
379. See supra notes 317-43 and accompanying text.
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issues, but it would have builders flocking to the jurisdiction, eager to take
advantage.3 so Therefore, the key to a successful and constitutional
inclusionary zoning program is to attract the developer with a developer-
focused program.38'
V. ECONOMIC PERSUASION AND ATTRACTION, THE CRUCIAL INGREDIENTS
FOR A SUCCESSFUL INCLUSIONARY ZONING PROGRAM
Recent research has indicated that mandatory inclusionary zoning
programs have failed to meet their most fundamental goal, namely, creating
adequate affordable housing in market-rate housing tracts.382 Even if the
goal of inclusionary zoning was merely to contribute to the number of
affordable housing units in a given community and to prohibit the
consolidation of poverty, many of the programs enforced by local cities and
counties have proven ineffective.383 Indeed, most of the enacted programs
380. See infra note 393 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 258-345 and accompanying
text (concerning the lack of adequate compensation argument).
381. Especially during economic recessions and depressions, developer-focused solutions take
advantage of the strengths of the private sector, and by refraining from governmental meddling,
policymakers unleash the strength of the private sector. See Megan J. Ballard, Profiting from
Poverty: The Competition Between For-Profit and Nonprofit Developers for Low-Income Housing
Tax Credits, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 211, 244 (2003) (noting that "[d]uring economic downturns,
lawmakers will likely be more supportive of for-profit housing developers because of the importance
of housing to national economic health"). This point is advanced by Howard Husock, director of the
Case Program at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, who advocates
the policy of letting the private market work unobstructed:
The unsubsidized housing market . . . [plays a] crucial role in weaving a healthy social
fabric and inspiring individuals to advance. . . . [Intervention] to provide the poor with
better housing than they could otherwise afford ... interfer[es] with a delicate system that
rewards effort and achievement by giving people the chance to live in better homes in
better neighborhoods.
HOWARD HUSOCK, AMERICA'S TRILLION-DOLLAR HOUSING MISTAKE 23-24 (2003).
382. The most recent studies on mandatory inclusionary zoning have not been supportive of this
affordable housing technique. The Home Builders Association holding, the legal foothold of many
mandatory inclusionary zoning programs, has been heavily criticized. The findings in Below Market
Housing Mandates as Takings: Measuring Their Impact show that the economic and political
assertions made by the California Supreme Court in Home Builders Association are contrary to the
newest research and data collected. See MEANS ET AL., supra note 22, at 15-16. Furthermore, in the
last four years, scholars and think-tanks have concluded that mandatory inclusionary programs
produce few units, have high costs, make "non-affordable" priced homes more expensive than true
market-value, restrict the supply of new homes, cost government revenues, and do not address the
cause of the affordability problem. See POWELL & STRINGHAM, supra note 10, at 3.
383. For comprehensive data, see POWELL & STRINGHAM, supra note 10; MEANS ET AL., supra
note 22. Moreover, if it is more important to create affordable housing than to realize the societal
goals of social and economic integration, many altematives and programs listed have proven
inadequate and, in some circumstances, counterproductive. See, e.g., Inclusionary Housing in
California, supra note 369, at 15. The town in the case study has touted its accomplishments of
creating 600 units of affordable housing; however, the in-lieu fees, off site construction, and land
dedications have allowed those units to be segregated from market-value units. Id. Effectively, the
town has substituted production over integration. Id.
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that create affordable housing have the tendency to do more harm than good,
mainly by contributing to the environment of segregatioh that inclusionary
zoning tries so desperately to eradicate.m Thus, it is apparent that
mandatory inclusionary zoning policy has not lived up to its promise.
Most of the ordinances throughout the United States that demand
mandatory inclusionary zoning set-asides are damaging housing markets. 8
They are also contributing to the ghettoization of communities through
separatist alternatives to set-asides, sometimes amounting to an
unconstitutional taking. To create effective, progressive affordable
housing programs, the right blend of policies and incentives and "an active
partnership between the private and public sectors" is the ultimate key for
success.388 Such a winning strategy can only be found in a voluntary
program that entices private cooperation, convinces developers to invest in
the program, and makes economic sense for all parties involved.
What is very disheartening, from a pragmatic point of view, is the
disregard many academics, students, and activists have for the wellbeing of
those who are responsible for the actual construction of affordable and
384. The consolidation of poverty occurs when production is valued over integration. Id
385. A University of Maryland study on the long-term effectiveness of inclusionary zoning
programs highlights the impotence and outright counterproductive tendencies of this affordable
housing technique. Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders, Inclusionary Zoning Acts as a Tax on Housing:
Studies Show Alternatives More Effective In Addressing Affordability Problems, Mar. 6, 2008,
http://www.nahb.org/news details.aspx?newslD=6327 ("According to standard economic theory,
inclusionary zoning acts like a tax on housing construction. And just like other taxes, the burdens of
inclusionary zoning are passed on to housing consumers, housing producers, and landowners. More
specifically, economic theory suggests that inclusionary zoning requirements act to decrease the
supply of housing at every price, raise housing prices, and slow housing construction. As a result,
inclusionary zoning policies could exacerbate the affordable housing problem that they are designed
to address.").
386. See POWELL & STRINGHAM, supra note 10, at 18. Pro-mandatory inclusionary zoning
activists believe that this technique is a cure all for every jurisdiction are undermined by recent
studies and reports, which, although attempting to suppress the impact on housing, reveal that
negative effects do occur. See Dan Mitchell, Rethinking Real Estate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2008, at
CS, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/29/technology/29online.html ("Not so, says a
report from the Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy, which studied how the programs
affected housing in San Francisco, Boston and Washington[]. If there are jumps in prices, they are
minimal.... In suburban Boston, the policy 'seems to have resulted in small decreases in production
and slight increases in the prices of single-family houses."').
387. See supra notes 110-380 and accompanying text.
388. Bibby, supra note 320. It is important that the partnership be a true joint partnership and not
a collaboration between an "ant and an elephant," where the government basically takes the reins on
the whole operation, effectively dissolving the benefits and necessity of mutualism. Thomas Sowell,
Random Thoughts, TOWNHALL.COM, Feb. 11, 2009, http://townhall.com/columnists
/ThomasSowell/2009/02/1 1/random thoughts.
1105
market-rate housing.389  Builders are not faceless corporate suits.390 Some
are small family operations that hire and employ individuals who themselves
may qualify for the particular affordable housing units that they are
building.39' Therefore, it is imperative to bring developers to the table
through persuasion, rather than force.392 This can only be achieved by a
program that is economically suitable for developers.393 An effective
389. See Alyssa Katz, Inclusionary Zoning's Big Moment: Cities Across the Country are Forcing
Developers to Build Affordable Housing. Could New York Soon Join Them?, CITY LIMITS, Jan. 1,
2005, at 22, available at http://www.citylimits.org/content/articles/ articleView.cfm?articlenumber
=1212 ("Real estate developers hold some high-value cards, too. The entire venture, after all,
depends on someone's willingness to produce and finance the development."). Developers are
basically tossed aside as merely a means to an end, and idealism has dehumanized the most
important entity involved in creating housing. It is assumed that because the developers are possibly
making a profit on the project the developer can be the one who pays for the affordable housing. See
Lerman, supra note 116, at 388 n.38, 391 (noting that the "burden of the [mandatory inclusionary
zoning] program will fall on developers" and "create a cost to the developer"); see also Dietderich,
supra note 22, at 103-04 (commenting that "[e]ven inclusionary programs that threaten builders'
profits change the nature of the housing stock, increase the Filter Rate, distribute the regional tax
base more evenly, lessen price pressure in existing urban communities, and increase the mobility,
opportunities, and wealth of the American poor"). Certain ideologues praise inclusionary zoning as
a progressive means of distributing wealth. See CHI. METRO. AGENCY FOR PLANNING,
INCLUSIONARY ZONING STRATEGY REPORT (2008), available at http://www.goto2040.org/
uploadedFiles/RCP/StrategyReports/Zoning/Inclusionary%/o2Zoning%2OReport.pdf
Unfortunately, by focusing on the claimed "wealth distributing" under these programs, many
proponents have undermined any wealth creating possibilities (a goal that is truly progressive),
resulting in private entities being responsible for duties and burdened by requirements that ultimately
cause financial hardship. See MEANS ET AL., supra note 22, at 5-6. One program in California
requires developers to sell homes that have a median price of $838,750 for $180,022 because of its
inclusionary housing scheme. Id. at 5. This is a loss of $658,748 per house that must be carried by
the developer. Id.
390. Some of the larger firms are quite massive (i.e., Shea Homes, Pulte Homes, and KB Homes)
and are publicly traded; however, these companies employ and hire hundreds of individuals, some
who are qualified for affordable housing. See Simply Hired, Average Homebuilders Salary for
Calabasas, California, http://www.simplyhired.com/alsalary/search/q-homebuilder/1-91301 (last
visited Nov. 20, 2009). The average construction superintendent in Calabasas, California makes
$67,000. Id. This is $3,000 less than the median income for Californians. See infra note 414.
391. See infra note 393 and accompanying text.
392. Because it is evident that mandatory policies-policies of coercion and force-have proven
faulty under scrutinous inspection, it is crucial that a new tactic is utilized in order to bring about the
most success. "Thus the Sun was declared the conqueror; and it has ever been deemed that
persuasion is better than force ..... AESOP, The Wind and the Sun, in AESOP'S FABLES (Unknown
trans., W. L. Allison 1881), available at http://www.litscape.com/author/Aesop/
TheWindAndTheSun.html.
393. As they currently operate, mandatory inclusionary zoning plans and voluntary inclusionary
plans are not attracting developers. The biggest complaint from housing advocates is that voluntary
inclusionary zoning programs do not work. See Tetreault, supra note 119, at 19 ("There are many
jurisdictions that have voluntary, or incentive-based, inclusionary zoning ordinances. The problem
is that most of them, because of their voluntary nature, produce very few units."). Furthermore,
Powell and Stringham note that "when the California Coalition for Rural Housing reported its survey
results, it noted that 'truly voluntary programs are generally unsuccessful in producing affordable
units."' See Powell & Stringham, supra note 326, at 486. It is apparent from the lack of developer
gusto that the incentives and benefits are not compensating for the losses attributed to compliance.
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program would be voluntary and allow developers to make a profit on
affordable houses that is comparable to what they would make on market-
rate houses without density bonuses, other incentives, or alternatives.394
The most promising means by which to achieve this is a two part plan.
The first part would require cities and counties to relinquish all permitting,
impact, mitigation, plan check, and surcharge fees for the affordable units. 95
See supra notes 317-43 and accompanying text. As mentioned above, mandatory inclusionary
zoning programs have proven to be just as ineffective, both in creating affordable units and
accomplishing the goals of inclusionary zoning. See supra notes 346-76 and accompanying text.
Regardless of these findings, mandatory inclusionary zoning advocates still point to the holding in
Home Builders Association that "below-market housing mandates offer compensating benefits and
necessarily increase the supply of affordable housing." News Release, Indep. Inst., New Study
Shows "Inclusionary Zoning" Hinders Development and Makes Housing Less Affordable (Nov. 12,
2007) (citing Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60, 64 (Ct. App. 2001)),
available at http://www.independent.org/newsroom/newsdetail.asp?newslD=94. If builders are not
flocking to be a part of these programs, yet advocates and courts are touting the benefits of these
programs, then why must they be mandated? This point is aptly addressed in The Economics of
Inclusionary Zoning Reclaimed: How Effective Are Price Controls?:
The real test of whether density bonuses (or other incentives) make up for the costs of
the program is if builders would voluntarily choose them. If a program was voluntary
and builders chose to provide below-market units in exchange for a density bonus, it
would demonstrate that the benefits more than offset the costs.
See Powell & Stringham, supra note 326, at 486.
394. This concept is supported by Paul Emrath, Ph.D, in The Economics ofInclusionary Zoning:
Again, the market adjusts by transferring the cost of IZ onto the buyers of new market
rate housing units in the form of fewer available units to buy and higher prices ... .The
effect on overall housing production and existing house prices remains ambiguous,
depending on how far the affordable house price is set below builders' costs and how
much of the loss can be passed on to buyers of new market rate homes.
What if . . . costs are lowered enough so builders can produce affordable units at a
normal profit? A jurisdiction may be able to accomplish this through the use of direct
subsidies, effective density bonuses, other development concessions, or builder
incentives. If costs can be lowered to a certain threshold this way, production and prices
on both categories of new housing are the same as they would be in the unregulated
market (unless the affordable set aside is so large that not all of the affordable units built
can not [sic] be sold at the maximum allowable price). From a purely economic
perspective, if costs are reduced far enough, the IZ ordinance becomes irrelevant ....
From a political perspective, some municipal decision makers may feel they can only
introduce strong cost reducing policies only the under cover of an IZ ordinance.
Emrath, supra note 301. The problem with a voluntary program is that "[d]evelopers have no
incentive to participate in a voluntary program unless they are better off as a result of such
participation." Marc T. Smith et al., Inclusionary Housing Programs: Issues and Outcomes, 25
REAL EST. L.J. 155, 164 (1996). Even in the event that the developer will be equally well off in
complying with the program, a perfect balance of cost and profit "is probably not a sufficient
incentive, given the potential problems in implementation. . . . [Thus], the cost side is the only place
in which an incentive can be created, and the incentive must be sufficiently large to more than offset
lower prices on non-market units." Id.
395. The possible fees needed to be paid are: plan check fees, environmental impact fees, building
check fees, building permit fees, public works fees, grading permit fees, electrical permit fees,
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In some jurisdictions, fees alone contribute to a significant percentage of
building costs. 396  By greatly minimizing these fees or removing them
altogether, the bottom-line building costs can be heavily reduced.9 The
second part of the plan is to allow builders to sell affordable units for
market-value production cost, " thus the profit made is in direct proportion
to the elimination of fees. 9
Opponents will decry that local governments will be losing out on the
revenues generated from building fees.4 00  However, many mandatory
inclusionary zoning programs currently allow for government subsidies to
assist buyers of affordable housing, which suggests that local government is,
in fact, paying for the below-market-rate houses.40 1 Moreover, recent studies
mechanical permit fees, plumbing permit fees, utility connection fees, sewer fees, storm drainage
fees, water connection fees, watershed fees, traffic mitigation fees, regional traffic fees, fire service
fees, police service fees, public safety fees, school fees, school mitigation fees, capital facilities fees,
park fees, open space fees, special assessment fees, and senior housing fees. DEP'T OF HOUS. &
CMTY. DEV., PAY TO PLAY: RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT FEES IN CALIFORNIA CITIES AND
COUNTIES, 1999, app. B (2001), available at http://www.hcd.ca.gov/hpd/pay2play/appb.pdf; see
also Bibby, supra note 320.
The single most important step a municipality can take is to provide additional tax
abatement to the density bonus units to make them affordable. Also, when jurisdictions
review and update their land-use and zoning requirements, this process must look at the
changing supply and mix of residential and commercial properties and the full set of
public policies that can be linked to the plans and codes.
Id.
396. DEP'T OF HOUS. & CMTY. DEV., PAY TO PLAY: RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT FEES IN
CALIFORNIA CITIES AND COUNTIES, 1999, at 87 (2001), available at
http://www.hcd.ca.gov/hpd/pay2play/feerpt.pdf ("California's high residential development fees
significantly contribute to its high housing costs and prices.").
397. Building fees can be quite extensive, and eliminating them can greatly reduce building costs.
For an illustration on how far-reaching fees can be, see the fee schedule for Los Angeles County.
L.A. COUNTY DEP'T OF PUB. WORKS, LAND DEVELOPMENT DIViSION: 2008-2009 FEE SCHEDULE
(2008), available at http://dpw.lacounty.gov/ldd/lib/publications/fees/2008/LandDevelopmentFees
2008-2009.pdf.
398. For example, assume that it would cost fictional builder HBC $300,000 to build a single
family home. Of the building cost, $75,000 is fees. Thus, true value building cost is $225,000.
Therefore, if the city did not charge fees for the production of that home, and if HBC sold the house
at $300,000, HBC would make $75,000 on the home. To make a comparable profit (twenty-five
percent), the $300,000 home would have to be sold for $400,000.
399. See infra notes 414-18 and accompanying text. Fees are not required by state law, so by
eliminating or greatly reducing building fees developers would be able to realize a profit by building
the affordable units and selling them for market-rate building cost. The California state legislature
and judiciary mentions the extent of fees, but does not demand that fees be charged to builders. See
Jean 0. Pasco, State High Court Ruling Puts Officials on Notice About Fees, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11,
2006, at B3. "California cities and counties cannot overcharge developers for building inspection
and permit fees as a way to fatten their coffers, the state Supreme Court ruled recently." Id.
400. Building fees account for a substantial percentage of building costs, equating to a large
amount of money collected by the municipality per unit built. See infra note 417. If a house costs
$500,000, and sixteen percent of that cost is city fees, the local government would collect
approximately $80,000 from the sale. Id.
401. See supra note 342 and accompanying text.
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show that the losses of revenue from property taxes and taxes on the sale of
affordable housing can be substantial over time.402 Thus, a minimum loss
upfront is a small price to pay for an effective inclusionary program that will
encourage developers to comply.
Additionally, a program that eliminates city and county fees and allows
builders to sell their affordable inventory at a market-rate cost has several
other benefits. First and foremost, this plan is constitutional.403 By allowing
the developer to realize a return on the property, the program will not be
found to deprive the property owner of his property's economic value, thus
sidestepping a possible Lingle violation.40 Second, by not having to offer
offsets, such as density bonuses, there are no limits to the number of
affordable housing units that can be built in a tract.405 Freedom from the
restrictions associated with a feasible density mix allows for a wider range
of inclusionary unit percentages within a development, opening the doors to
more affordable units.406 Third, because the sales price is based solely on
building costs, the affordable units will not be subject to demand-price-
increases.407 This plan will require the municipality to heavily regulate who
402. Because inclusionary zoning restricts resale values for a number of years, the loss in annual
tax revenue can become substantial. See POWELL & STRINGHAM, supra note 10, at 4 (noting that
since the beginning of the ordinance's enactment in San Francisco and the Bay Area, "[t]he total
present value of lost government revenue ... is upwards of $553 million").
403. See supra notes 239-345 and accompanying text.
404. See id; see also MEANS ET AL., supra note 22, at 3-4 (noting that the Lucas holding, which is
a part of the Lingle holding, raises issue with the framework, structure, and execution of current
mandatory inclusionary zoning programs).
405. Density bonuses are truly limited by the feasible amount of units that can be added to a
project; thus, by not instituting, or requiring institution of, this type of offset, affordable inventory is
not limited by space and area restrictions. See supra notes 317-338 and accompanying text. A
program that allows for a density bonus in return for affordable units cannot create affordable
housing beyond what the building site allows for. Therefore, a density bonus beyond a certain
amount is worthless. See Powell & Stringham, supra note 326, at 485-86. By not needing a density
bonus to off-set the losses on affordable housing units, a program can potentially constitute a very
high percentage of affordable housing. Id.
406. See Powell & Stringham, supra note 326, at 486.
407. See Emrath, supra note 301 (noting that the volatility of demand contributes to a hyper-
volatility in price). Building costs are not directly related to the volatility of housing demands.
Although the list below is tailored to highway construction, many of the factors below are relevant in
housing construction costs:
[I.] Localized material shortages for specific construction products,
[2.] Consolidation in the . . . industry (number of prime contractors, ownership of
quarries, etc.),
[3.] Larger ... construction programs with the same number of contractors,
[4.] Increased construction market opportunities in other areas . . .,
[5.] Downsizing of workforce due to instability of [the market] ... ,
[6.] Spot shortages of skilled labor,
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is qualified to purchase the affordable units, so as to benefit those for whom
the program is designed.408 Fourth, because offsets are a must,409 a fee-free
program does not involve the negative issues of density bonuses, 410 which in
turn means less public outcry for developments that involve high density
affordable housing.411 Fifth, because the program is voluntary and enticing
to builders, municipalities will not have to offer alternatives when it is
impossible to include the affordable units in the new development.412 This
plan entices a developer to build affordable units among market-rate units,
thereby truly achieving the goal of inclusionary zoning.
Using the most recent census records, the following analysis illustrates
the possible pricing under this plan. According to the U.S. Census Bureau,
the 2008 median income for a family of four in the state of California4 13 was
$70,712.414 The 2008 median home price in California was $427,271.415 If
developers made approximately twenty percent on the home,4 16 the median
[7.] Regulatory restrictions ... ,
[8.] Increased technical requirements in contracts, [and]
[9.] Bankruptcies ....
U.S. Dep't of Transp., Highway Construction Cost Increases and Competition Issues,
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/programadmin/contracts/price.cfm (last visited Nov. 20, 2009).
408. A great danger is the allowance of unqualified candidates getting the units, but many
municipalities have strict qualification guidelines written into their affordable housing program. See
L.A. HoUs. DEP'T, COMMONLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT AFFORDABLE HOUSING 1-2 (2007),
available at http://lahd.lacity.org/lahdinternet/Portals/O/Policy/affhsgrosterQA.pdf (describing who
is qualified for affordable housing in the City of Los Angeles).
409. See supra notes 295-307 and accompanying text.
410. See supra notes 317-38 and accompanying text.
411. See supra notes 33 5-38; supra notes 368-77 and accompanying text (noting that NIMBY
issues can cause not only negative publicity for the project, but also price increases from project
delays).
412. Currently, many municipalities must offer alternatives for their mandatory inclusionary
zoning program to work. See supra notes 346-76 and accompanying text. Some cities have found
that alternatives are necessary for their inclusionary zoning program to function. See Cent. City
Ass'n of L.A., Alternative to Inclusionary Zoning Plan: "Housing for All: Fair Share Program",
CCA FOCUS, 3d Quarter 2004, available at http://www.ccala.org/downloads/1_03 newsletter/
Q3 2004_CCA Focus.pdf.
413. The author used California in this illustration because it is the largest state and has the most
inclusionary zoning programs, thus providing the author with the widest collection of possible
empirical data. See MEANS ET AL., supra note 22, at 8.
414. See U.S. Census Bureau, Income, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/4person.html
(last visited Nov. 20, 2009).
415. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, MEDIAN SALES PRICE OF EXISTING SINGLE-
FAMILY HOMES FOR METROPOLITAN AREAS (2008), available at http://www.realtor.org/
wps/wcm/connect/c5200d8O4bf84ae9beb7befdaO86ccOa/RELO8Q3T.pdfMOD-AJPERES&CACH
EID-c5200d804bf84ae9beb7befda086ccOa.
416. This percentage of income is likely overvalued since the median price in California, based on
an average of median prices in California's seven largest metropolitan areas, dropped from $613,000
in the third quarter of 2007 to $427,271 in the third quarter of 2008. Id. This is a drop of more than
thirty percent. In the illustration in the text, twenty percent was used based on the assertion that
developers go into projects anticipating a return of twenty percent on their investments. See supra
1110
[Vol. 37: 1039, 2010] Mandatory Inclusionary Zoning Practices
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
market-value cost is $341,816.80, including taxes, fees, marketing costs and
exactions. Subtracting the fees (approximately $68,363.36) from the
market-value cost yields a bare building cost of $273,453.44.417 Therefore,
if the developer wanted to make a twenty percent profit on the bare building
cost, the affordable housing cost would be $341,816.80,418 nearly $86,000
less than the market-rate price and a twenty percent drop in the selling price.
Of course, these calculations are based on ratio data and may vary from city
to city; however, this example illustrates the potential pricing possibilities
under this plan.
The one serious drawback of this plan is that the selling price of the
affordable units is very rigid. For developers to see a profit, they would
have to sell the affordable units at a certain percentage above their building
cost, preferably at the building cost of the market-rate units. Any lower, and
the city or county would commit an unconstitutional taking. What does this
mean? Basically, it means that the lowest of the low-income bracket may
possibly be out of reach of buying these affordable units.419 As mentioned
above, the 2008 median income for a family of four in the state of California
was $70,712, which means that "very low"-income individuals made
approximately $35,000, and "low"-income individuals made approximately
$46,000.420 Individuals at these levels would have an immensely difficult
time affording a home in California, which had a 2008 median home price of
text accompanying note 300; Langston, supra note 300.
417. A Public Policy Institute of California Research Brief states that in 1997, "fees imposed on
new [residential] construction [weire significant, typically falling in the range of $20,000 to $30,000
per dwelling." PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., DEVELOPMENT FEES AND NEW HOMES: PAYING THE
PRICE IN CALIFORNIA 1 (1997), available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/rb/RB_697SSRB.pdf.
That same year, the average home price in California was $169,000. John Karevoll, SoCal Home
Sales and Prices Surge, DQNEWS.CoM, Aug. 1997, http://archive.dqnews.com/ AA1997SCA08.
shtm. This means that the percentage of fees on the sale price of the home in California is roughly
sixteen percent. In the illustration above, the average fees in California, using the ratio data from
1997, are about $68,363.36.
418. This number is determined by adding a 20% profit margin of $54,690.69 on top of
$273,453.44.
419. The price controls are set using different formulas so that the "inclusionary" units will be
affordable to either "Very Low," "Low," or "Moderate" income households, or some combination
thereof. See Affordable Housing Online, Common Questions, http://www.affordablehousingonline.
com/whatis.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2009). "Very Low" income is most often classified as up to
50% of county median income, "low" as 50 to 80% of median, and "moderate" as 80 to 120% of
median. Id.
420. U.S. Census Bureau, Income, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/4person.html (last
visited Nov. 20, 2009). It is possible to determine the "low" and "very low" income levels based on
the median income for California. See supra note 419.
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$427,271.421 However, even radical inclusionary zoning programs would be
strained tremendously to include homebuyers at the "very low"-income
level.422
VI. CONCLUSION
The goal of inclusionary zoning is twofold: create more affordable
housing units and integrate such units with market-value units. This can be
achieved by adopting a plan that is voluntary and entices builders to
participate. Builders and developers run on a demanding "return on
investment" system. Thus, economic incentive is the key to encouraging
developer participation. By making affordable housing programs profitable,
cities and counties will not be burdened by the weaknesses of density
bonuses, in-lieu fees, land dedications, and off-site construction. This can be
achieved by cutting the fees and taxes on the affordable units and selling
them for market-value cost. Although such a plan unfortunately does not dip
into the lowest economic brackets, it is one step closer to achieving the goals
of inclusionary zoning.
Michael Floryan*
421. Assuming that "Very Low" and "Low" income families spend 30 to 35% of their income on
housing to qualify for affordable housing, these two categories can only spend between $875 and
$1,341 per month on housing. Based on a simple mortgage calculator, after a $15,000 down
payment, an interest rate of 5.75%, and a thirty-year loan, these two categories can qualify to buy a
house ranging from $164,938.43 to $244,791.36. The median home price in California, based on an
averaging of the 2008 median home prices in California's seven largest metropolitan areas, was
$427,271.
422. See generally POWELL & STRINGHAM, supra note 10. The findings of some of the more
aggressive inclusionary zoning programs reveal the extensive failures of these policies in their
assistance of the poor. Id. The plethora of housing programs, no matter how "progressive,"
continues to fail the neediest.
Some states and municipalities have adopted measures to incentivize or require the
construction of limited affordable housing, such as linkage fees (which require
contributions from housing developers for off-site, low-income housing construction) and
inclusionary zoning measures (which require developers to designate a percentage of
their residential projects to low- or moderate-income housing), but these programs have
been unable to satisfy demand, particularly for the lowest-income groups.
Michelle Wilde Anderson, Cities Inside Out: Race, Poverty, and Exclusion at the Urban Fringe, 55
UCLA L. REv. 1095, 1147 n.180 (2008); see also supra note 389 (noting the excessive burden that
must be endured by developers under a highly radical mandatory inclusionary zoning program).
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